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Identity Fraud: A Critical National and Global Threat
Identity  fraud  is  a  national  and  global  threat  to  the 
security of nations and their citizens, the economy, and 
global commerce, as it facilitates a wide range of crimes 
and terrorism.  While there have been numerous studies 
and reports on identity theft, this white paper discusses 
the differences between identity fraud and identity theft, 
as  well  as  their  similarities.    The  paper  also  considers 
legal,  societal,  and  technical  approaches  to  managing 
identity fraud while recognizing their policy and practical 
limitations.  The  key  issues  addressed  in  this  paper 
include:
•  Identity fraud, a quantitatively and 
qualitatively larger problem than identity 
theft, threatens national security, global 
commerce, and the protection of society.
•  Advanced research, a national identity 
fraud classification system, and statistical 
assessments are required to evaluate 
and monitor the various permutations, 
root causes, and criminal implications of 
identity fraud.
•  There is an indisputable need for identity 
authentication, especially information-
based identity authentication, to manage 
the identity fraud problem.  The known 
paucity of global data sharing must be 
addressed.
•  Fundamental privacy interests must be 
balanced with the need for personal 
information in identity authentication 
applications.
•  Information sharing policies and 
technical solutions are crucial to 
managing identity fraud while enhancing 
privacy protection. 
•  A national and global strategy is 
essential in order to combat identity 
fraud.
The Identity Fraud Threat
Identity theft has been at the forefront as a societal problem for 
several years.  The public has been made aware of the dangers 
of identity theft, particularly to personal and financial security.   
Many studies have been completed concerning the size and 
scope of victimization.  The government, credit card and other 
financial service industries have responded by putting tighter 
controls in place.  On the other hand, the insidious threat of 
identity fraud has not been similarly acknowledged.  Both the 
public and private sectors must understand and confront the 
enormity of the identity fraud problem so that it can be solved.  
Identity fraud, which encompasses identity theft, is the use of 
false identifiers, false or fraudulent documents, or a stolen 
identity in the commission of a crime.  It often emanates 
from a breeder document created from fictitious or stolen 
identifiers.  The breeder document, such as a driver’s license 
or  birth  certificate,  is  used  to  spawn  other  documents, 
resulting in the creation of a credible identity which allows 
a criminal or terrorist access to credit cards, employment, 
bank accounts, secure facilities, computer systems, and the 
like.  Once a criminal or terrorist has an established identity, 
he can use it to facilitate a variety of economic crimes, drug 
trafficking, terrorism, and other crimes.  
At one time, not that many years ago, a breeder document, 
such as a driver’s license, meant something; it could be used 
to establish a person’s identity with little or no question.  Now, 
technology  has  enabled  criminals  to  produce  fraudulent 
documents,  which  can  be  used  to  procure  additional 
fraudulent documents.  Counterfeit documents, such as credit 
cards, used to be easily detectable; now it is relatively easy 
to produce a counterfeit hologram that usually passes for the 
real thing. Counterfeit documents are now readily available 
to  illegal  immigrants,  drug  traffickers,  and  international 
terrorists. Technology and the ability of the criminal element 
to adapt and defeat existing identification methodologies, 
predicated  on  breeder  documents  that  are  susceptible  to 
counterfeiting, have made it necessary to develop different, 
more advanced identity authentication systems. 
Identity fraud is a component of almost every major crime 
and its presence is felt throughout the world.  Therefore, 
it  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  importance  of  identity 
authentication is recognized whenever the potential result of 
misidentification is the commission or perpetuation of criminal 
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activity.  Government and industry leadership is necessary to 
facilitate the development of policies and technological tools 
that will assure accurate identity authentication. 
Advanced Research and National             
Identity Fraud Classification
 
Identity fraud has become the enabling agent, in effect, the 
catalyst, for various types of financial crimes, terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and other crimes.  In the case of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, several of the terrorists are alleged to have used 
fraudulent identification documents such as driver’s licenses, 
stolen credit cards, fictitious and/or temporary addresses, 
false passports and other fraudulent travel documents, and 
fictitious Social Security Numbers.  Although the terrorists’ 
commission of identity fraud is one of the most notorious 
cases, there are many others. However, there is no system 
in place for collecting statistical data on identity fraud, so 
that  its  size,  scope,  and  impact  can  be  understood  and 
addressed.  Most of the available statistics concentrate on 
identity theft and its victims, rather than identity fraud.  
The implementation of a research agenda, including a national 
system for identity fraud classification and collection of data on 
identity fraud is crucial.  Analysis of the data will expose trends 
and criminal behavioral patterns which will provide the basis 
for the development of prevention and detection methods and 
the promulgation of legislation and regulations.
Need for Information-Based Authentication  
and Global Data
The only system of authentication that focuses on determining 
the validity of personal identifiers is information-based identity 
authentication, a form of knowledge-based authentication. 
When a person is new to an institution and there is no trusted 
credential or biometric, the only reliable means to determine 
that the person is who he says he is, is an information-based 
identity authentication system. An information-based system 
of identity authentication is an independent assessment of 
what the individual in question represents about his identity, 
based on an analysis of available information pertaining to 
that individual.  It applies  three levels of risk management: 
validation, verification, and authentication. To be effective, 
such  a  system  must  incorporate  the  following  critical 
components: risk, cost, speed of decision making, availability 
of  information,  and  the  sophistication  of  the  individuals/
organizations making the threat.  Generally speaking, as the 
risk or threat increases, more sophisticated methods of risk 
management must be employed. The system must address an 
increased risk or threat by continuously evaluating additional 
types and quality of data from domestic and global sources. 
Additional data needs may result in increased operational 
cost,  the  need  for  more  sophisticated  delivery  systems, 
and further refinement of global and domestic information 
sharing policies. 
The paucity of global data, a widely acknowledged problem, 
hampers the effectiveness of an information-based identity 
authentication  system  and,  therefore,  must  be  addressed.   
The 9/11 terrorists attacks highlight the deficiency of global 
information and point out how imperative it is to acquire and 
integrate such data in order to authenticate identity.
Balancing Privacy Interests with the Need for 
Personal Information 
An  information-based  identity  authentication  system  is 
dependent  on  personally  identifiable  information,  which 
is  information  that  is  identifiable  to  a  real  person.    The 
collection, use, and distribution of such data has privacy 
implications.    The  extent  of  the  privacy  implications  is 
sometimes  defined  by  law,  but  even  in  the  absence  of 
applicable legal principles, it is shaped by notions of fair 
use.  However, fair use of personally identifiable information 
is a relative notion requiring context for application.   
Privacy  interests  in  the  information  used  for  identity 
authentication must be balanced with the particular need for 
identity authentication. This requires an assessment of the 
potential harm that misidentification in a given transaction 
might  cause.    For  example,  if  the  risk  of  harm  from 
misidentification in a transaction is a terrorist event, then the 
use of sensitive personally identifiable information might be 
justified.  However, even in such a context, fair information use 
considerations apply, as the data used must be proportional.   
That is, the data used in the identity authentication process 
must be relevant and necessary to accomplish the requisite 
confidence level of authentication.  Also, fair information 
practices, such as notice, choice, access, security, limited 
use, and enforcement, should be employed in the identity 
authentication process to the extent practicable.
Information Sharing Policies and Use of 
Technology
To effectively combat identity fraud, authentication solutions 
must  respond  to  the  continuously  changing  face  of  the 
criminal.  As the criminal surmises the process for identity 
authentication, he will eventually attempt to craft an identity 
to  avoid  the  detection  system.    This  process  of  detection 
avoidance must be matched through constant monitoring 6
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of  the  effectiveness  of  the  identity  authentication  system, 
continuous upgrading of data sets, regular enhancements in 
the algorithmic models, and other technological changes.
 
The need for continuous changes in the sources, types, and 
quality of data require the existence of a trusted environment.   
This trust must envelop the relationships among data owners, 
data aggregators, data users, and data subjects. To create 
this trusted environment, information sharing policies, in the 
form of rules, must be established that govern how data can 
be used, the persons who can access it, and the purposes 
for its use.  Most importantly, adherence to the rules must 
be  verifiable  within  the  context  of  appropriate  oversight; 
the  more  sensitive  the  information,  as  seen  through  the 
eyes of the data owner or subject, the greater the need for 
verification to occur in real or near real time.  Technological 
tools  to  accomplish  this  requirement  are  available  and 
should be deployed.
A National and Global Strategy to Combat 
Identity Fraud
Legislation  and  regulations,  information  policies, 
technological  solutions,  education  and  training,  and 
public awareness have attempted to combat identity fraud.   
However, because those efforts have not yet been enough, 
implementing a national and global strategy is crucial. The 
many challenges to doing so are raised throughout the white 
paper and include: easy access to false identifiers, limitations 
on domestic and global information sharing, privacy and 
information  security  policy,  domestic  and  global  policy, 
dedicated resources, and leadership.
In the United States, the federal legislation that has been 
developed to address the identity fraud problem has focused 
on  two  means  of  risk  mitigation:  first,  the  criminalization 
of  conduct  relating  to  identity  fraud;  and  second,  the 
strengthening of tools designed to authenticate the identities 
of individuals.  The solutions offered have focused on the 
criminalization of the misuse of identities and the imposition 
of tighter privacy and security requirements on the use of 
personally  identifiable  information.    Even  when  particular 
legislation  has  promoted  identity  authentication,  it  has 
been  biometric  and  credential-based,  while,  with  limited 
exceptions such as Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT ACT, 
failing to recognize the need for information-based identity 
authentication solutions.   
 
This study recommends several courses of action including 
a national and global identity authentication strategy based 
on improved data collection, focused research, information 
sharing  policies,  and  technology  applications  to  facilitate 
sharing while insuring privacy. Seven core recommendations 
are presented:
1. Gain a commitment from the highest levels 
of federal government to lead and fund 
a national strategy to combat the identity 
fraud problem.  Strong national leadership and 
significant resources are required to combat this 
growing domestic and global problem.  
2. Establish a central information database of 
identity fraud incidents. There is a great need 
to measure the size, scope, and trends of identity 
fraud.  This can only be done through a new 
national identity fraud classification system. 
 
3. Establish a national identity fraud research 
agenda. Several research studies are proposed 
to increase the knowledge of identity fraud in 
terms of the size and scope of identity fraud, 
how criminal organizations use identify fraud as 
a facilitator of their crimes, the effectiveness of 
identity fraud investigations and prosecutions, 
and the characteristics of victims.
4. Establish more sophisticated domestic and 
global information-sharing networks. The 
key to identity authentication is access to data 
to assist in the validation, verification, and 
authentication of personal identifiers.  While 
some information-sharing networks do exist, 
they are fragmented, limited, and not easily 
accessible.  Greater access is required, especially 
for global data, to determine if the identity 
presented is valid.
5. Study domestic and global policies, laws, 
and regulations to determine the best 
practices to combat identity fraud. A 
comprehensive study of existing domestic and 
global laws and regulations concerning identity 
fraud, data collection, and information sharing 
will ascertain areas of ambiguity and gaps, 
review potential remedies, suggest methods of 
sharing data, and propose model identity fraud 
laws.   These results should yield a best practices 
approach for managing identity fraud and 
be the first step in developing agreements for 
promulgating comprehensive laws and sharing 
data on a global basis.7
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6. Develop a policy to enhance the 
protection of individual privacy and 
information ownership.  Inherent in all of the 
recommendations proposed in this white paper is 
the goal of enhancing the protection of privacy.  
As solutions are developed to combat identity 
fraud, it is crucial to consider the enhancement 
of individual privacy and information ownership.  
Policies which require the protection of privacy 
while balancing the need for information sharing 
must be established.  
7.  Improve information sharing systems that 
enhance identity authentication solutions 
while protecting privacy.  Because the 
initial enrollment period is the critical stage 
in preventing identity fraud, an information 
based authentication system is the only solution 
that truly addresses the issue.  While identity 
authentication systems currently exist, they 
are not robust enough nor do they provide 
the requisite privacy and information security 
that must be included in a trusted system.  
Therefore, the focus must be on the research 
and development of a trusted system that will 
effectively and efficiently authenticate identity, 
while maintaining the privacy and security of 
personal identifier information.  
Identity fraud is a growing national and global crisis.  Its 
pervasiveness must be recognized, especially as a facilitator 
of crimes that threaten national security, the economy, and 
global commerce.  If identity fraud is not seen as a significant 
and insidious threat, it will not be dealt with accordingly.   
Without a national and global strategy, identity fraud will 
continue  to  grow  exponentially,  as  will  the  possibility  of 
financial crimes, terrorist acts, drug trafficking, gun running, 
and alien smuggling, all of which have an adverse impact on 
the global community and commerce.
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Identity fraud has become a major concern for the public 
and private sectors, particularly as it relates to terrorism, 
money laundering and financial crime, drug trafficking, 
alien smuggling, and weapons smuggling.  It is defined 
as the use of false identifiers, fraudulent documents, or a 
stolen identity (identity theft) in the commission of a crime, 
and has been used for decades by criminals and criminal 
organizations to help facilitate their criminal activities and 
to avoid detection.   Identity fraud is broader than identity 
theft in that identity fraud refers to the fraudulent use of 
any identity, real or fictitious, while identity theft is limited 
to the theft of a real person’s identity.
However,  it  was  the  events  of  September  11,  and  the 
investigation conducted afterwards, that awakened society 
to the fact that the criminal use of false identifiers and false 
identification documents is not just a significant component 
of fraud, but also of terrorism.  Further examination has 
revealed that the criminal use of false identifiers and false 
documents is an integral part of many crimes committed 
by global criminal groups, including drug traffickers, gun 
runners, cyber criminals and alien smugglers.  In each 
of these areas, the organized criminal enterprises exploit 
weak  or  non-existent  verification  systems.    This  broad 
criminal  use  of  false  identifiers  and  false  identification 
documents  requires  a  new  term,  a  term  different  from 
“identity theft, “ which has a more limited connotation.  In 
this White Paper, it is referred to as “identity fraud.”
While identity theft has long been recognized as a crime 
that pervades our society, identity fraud has not.  There 
are  many  websites  that  provide  the  public  with  tips  to 
avoid  having  their  identities  stolen  and  remedies  to 
employ if they are victims of identity theft.  As evidenced 
by the passage of identity theft laws and other regulations 
since  1998,  there  has  been  a  dramatic  increase  in 
the  widespread  use  of  these  methods  by  criminals  and 
terrorists.    This  has  been  facilitated  by  the  exponential 
growth  of  the  Internet,  allowing  illegal  access  to 
personal  identifiers  through  hacking  and  to  websites 
that demonstrate how to create and/or obtain fraudulent 
documents.  Awareness of identity fraud has also grown.   
“The  events  of  September  11,  2001,  have  heightened 
concerns  about  the  contributory  role  that  identity  fraud 
plays in facilitating terrorism and other serious crimes.” 
(Stana, June 25, 2002)  
However,  there  is  no  single  data  source  that  compiles 
and  reports  all  incidences  of  identity  fraud,  making  the 
measurement  of  the  size  and  scope  of  the  problem  very 
difficult.   Because identity fraud is used to facilitate crimes, 
information about it is not reported separately, but as a part 
of many other types of crime. There is no central repository 
for data that is collected and none of the federal government 
repositories, such as the UCR (Uniform Crime Reports) and 
NIBRS (National Incident-Based Reporting System), collect 
specific data on identity fraud or theft.  Most of the available 
information comes from industry organizations or individual 
federal  government  agencies  such  as  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission.  Limited conclusions about identity fraud and 
theft can be gleaned from the statistics that are gathered by 
such agencies.
The credit card industry began collecting data on identity theft 
and account takeovers in the mid 90’s.  Although identity 
theft accounted for a very small percentage of total credit 
card fraud, various industries and legislators were forced to 
respond to it sooner than otherwise would have been the case 
because of the insidious way in which it destroys individuals’ 
credit ratings and impacts their financial stability.  “In fiscal 
year 1995, the Postal Inspection Service began tracking mail 
theft cases involving fraudulent credit-card applications and 
change of addresses.  In October 1997, also in reference 
to fraudulent credit-card activity, the Secret Service began 
tracking cases involving identity takeover” (Identity Fraud, 
May 1998). The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence 
Act of 1998 made it illegal to, “knowingly transfer or use, 
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another 
person with the intent  to commit,  or to  aid or abet,  any 
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, 
or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or 
local law.” The act also focused on the consumer as a victim 
and set up a central repository for reporting the crime. “In 
November 1999, the FTC established the Identity Theft Data 
Clearinghouse to provide a central repository of consumer 
complaints about identity theft” (Federal Trade Commission, 
August 30, 2000).  Drawing on statistics from many of these 
sources, this paper provides an extensive assessment of the 
growing problem of identity theft and fraud.
As the size and scope of the problem begin to be understood, 
it is evident that identity fraud is linked to many global crimes, 
including terrorism, money laundering and financial crimes, 
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drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and weapons smuggling. 
The horrific events of September 11, 2001 and the resulting 
focus on terrorism have brought much scrutiny and attention 
to identity fraud as far more than a crime against consumers.   
Security  concerns  have  quickly  emerged  in  the  areas  of 
immigration, border crossings, airline passengers, Hazmat 
(hazardous materials) driver’s licenses, and pilot training.  At 
the center of all of these concerns is the need to authenticate 
individuals to determine if they are who they claim to be.
With little in place to stop identity fraud or to adapt as the 
perpetrators  change  their  methods,  seeking  the  highest 
return for the lowest risk, both domestic and international 
perpetrators  are  able  to  establish  legitimate  identities  for 
themselves.    Once  they  have  stolen  an  identity  and/or 
created  a  false  identification  document,  they  are  able  to 
create  a  fraudulent  identity  for  themselves  which  allows 
them  to  cross  borders  and  then  provides  them  access  to 
such identification documents as birth certificates, drivers’ 
licenses, and social security cards.  Those documents, in 
turn,  create  greater  access  by  allowing  them  to  procure 
employment,  credit  cards,  green  cards,  bank  accounts, 
marriage certificates, leases, mortgages, and the like.  With 
a job, a permanent address, and a credit record, they have 
established a credible identity.  That credible identity enables 
them to engage in criminal activity – financial crimes, money 
laundering, smuggling, etc. – for profit, concealment, and/or 
to support terrorism. 
  
Identity fraud will continue to grow exponentially until there 
are systems in place to authenticate individuals.  New laws 
and  regulations,  technology,  education,  training,  strong 
leadership,  and  information  policy  are  needed  to  control 
identity  fraud.    Without  access  to  specialized  data  bases 
and  trusted  technology,  and  the  education  and  training 
necessary to operate them, decision makers are ill equipped 
to make accurate assessments in very short periods of time.   
Laws and regulations are necessary in order to insure that 
policies and methods of determining identity are uniformly 
applied and so that criminals can be held accountable for 
their wrongdoings.  Information policy will provide direction 
for information sharing and the resolution of privacy issues.   
There are many challenges to developing the means to stop 
this growing problem, including global policy, limited data 
analysis  and  the  inability  to  measure  the  size  and  scope 
of the problem, sharing of public and private information, 
issues  surrounding  protection  of  privacy,  the  availability 
of  and  easy  access  to  false  identification  sources,  and 
dedicated resources for development and implementation of 
technology, education, and training.  A strong line of defense 
is  essential  to  prevent  skilled  criminals  and  terrorist  from 
gaining access to entry points that allow them to commit 
crimes of profit and terrorism.
To that end, an analysis of legislative and regulatory efforts 
with  respect  to  identity  theft  and  fraud,  the  continuing 
risks and vulnerabilities, and an assessment of additional 
legislative and regulatory efforts needed to address those 
risks and vulnerabilities are presented here.  Also addressed 
are  fraudulent  conduct,  privacy,  information  sharing,  and 
appropriate access, distribution, and use policies. 
An analysis of current laws and regulations is not enough, 
however.    Authentication  methods  and  proven  risk 
management  strategies  that  provide  the  basis  for  faster 
and  more  effective  decision  making  must  be  developed 
and employed in determining identity.  Information analysis, 
including  scoring  and  modeling,  enable  this  model.   
Information  sharing  and  data  integration  from  three  key 
sources, commercial, private, and public, provide the fodder 
for performing sophisticated information analysis, which can 
then be shared across the affected parties.  This analysis 
must occur within a trusted environment.  
Model systems, such as Radiant Trust, provide examples of 
potential  solutions  for  sharing  appropriate  information  in 
order to facilitate identity authentication.  The challenges this 
serious societal problem poses are many; the authors attempt 
to answer those challenges by providing recommendations 
to manage them.
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Identity Theft
1
Determining the frequency and growth of any crime area 
is a daunting task. Official statistics generated from data 
gathered  by  law  enforcement  entities  (e.g.,  the  FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Reports) afford some degree of insight into 
key characteristics of the crimes, but account for only those 
crimes that are reported to authorities. Such statistics are 
also directly affected by shifts in enforcement strategy that 
could influence reporting patterns. Victim surveys partially 
solve  the  problem  of  uncovering  the  “dark  number”  of 
unreported crimes, but often suffer from non-response bias 
and are dependent on the victim’s memory and complete 
understanding of the victimization. These and other common 
problems  inherent  in  measuring  criminal  activity  are 
amplified when an attempt is made to determine the extent 
of identity theft in the U.S. 
The relatively newly evolved crime category of identity fraud 
presents  additional  problems  for  measurement  accuracy.   
Identity theft is frequently not counted by law enforcement 
agencies  as  a  discrete  crime,  but  as  a  subset  of  other 
economic crimes; this can unintentionally mask the frequency 
and gravity of identity theft when criminal occurrences are 
tabulated. Another problem is that the collection of raw data 
on identity theft is decentralized and largely dependent on 
an amalgam of federal, state and local enforcement data 
that, in some respects, is piecemeal and in other ways is 
duplicative. Finally, because identity fraudsters are able to 
sustain their criminal activities for extended periods prior to 
victim awareness of the crimes, the aforementioned victim 
survey drawbacks for collecting valid data are exacerbated. 
In short, achieving a true measure of identity theft in the U.S. 
today is one of the most challenging tasks facing the law 
enforcement community.
The  most  noteworthy  attempt  to  synthesize  the  extent  of 
identity  theft  has  been  conducted  by  the  U.S.  General 
Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO reports on identity theft 
furnish a glimpse of identity theft patterns in the U.S. For its 
report  titled,  “Identity  Theft:  Prevalence  and  Cost  Appear 
to  be  Growing,”  (General  Accounting  Office,  March  1, 
2002, GAO-02-363) the GAO relied upon multiple sources 
for its measurement of identity theft. The GAO combined 
original interview data from law enforcement officials with 
documentation from represented law enforcement agencies 
(i.e.,  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  [FBI];  Internal 
Revenue  Service  [IRS];  the  Social  Security  Administration 
[SSA];  Secret  Service;  Postal  Inspection  Service;  and  the 
Federal Trade Commission [FTC]). The GAO merged this 
information with data collected from three national consumer 
reporting  agencies  and  two  payment  card  associations 
(MasterCard and VISA). 
Victim data, reported by individual victims of identity theft 
to the FTC, was generated primarily through GAO’s Identity 
Theft Data Clearinghouse. From November 1999 through 
September 2001, the Center reported a consistently rising 
total  of  identity  theft.  The  GAO  points  out  that  the  FTC 
averaged 445 identity theft reports per week in November 
1999.  The  total  rose  to  over  2,000  reports  per  week  in 
March 2001 and over 3,000 reports per week in December 
2001 (General Accounting Office, March 1, 2002, GAO-
02-363) 
In a more recent study, “Federal Trade Commission—Identity 
Theft  Survey  Report,”  released  September  3,  2003,  the 
results  of  a  victimization  survey,  conducted  during  March 
and April 2003, of a randomly selected group of over 4000 
participants in the United States are reported.  The study’s 
objectives included “estimate the incidence of identity theft 
victimization” and “measure the impact of identity theft on 
the victims (p. 2).”  The study classifies identity theft into 
three categories: “new accounts and other frauds, misuse 
of  existing  non-credit  or  account  number,  and  misuse  of 
existing credit card or credit card number (p. 4).”  The results 
indicate that 4.6% of those surveyed had been victims of at 
least one of the forms of identity theft in the past year.  When 
generalized to the U.S. population, the extrapolated figure of 
identity theft victims in the US in the past year is 9.91 million.   
The reported losses to business including financial institutions 
for all forms of identity theft were estimated at $47.6 billion.   
This  figure  was  derived  by  multiplying  the  average  loss 
per victim in each of the three categories by the number 
of victims in each category. Using the same methodology 
described above, the cost to victims was assessed.  The out 
of pocket expenses to rectify the identity theft victimization 
was estimated to be $5.0 Billion (p. 7).  Respondents were 
1 For the purposes of this section, the term “identity theft” is used more 
frequently than “identity fraud,” because agencies which report these 
crimes use the category “identity theft.”
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also asked about victimization in the past five years. The 
results  indicate  that  within  the  last  five  years,  27  million 
adults in the United States have been victims (p. 12).  
This study provides the most credible estimates of the size, 
scope, and financial impact of identity theft victimization in 
the United States to date.    Unfortunately, the study sheds 
little light on the identity fraud problem.  The report indicates,   
“3% of victims said that they were aware that the thief had 
used  their  personal  information  to  obtain  government 
documents, such as a driver’s license or social security card 
(p. 37).”  The authors suggest that this number may be low 
because  victims  would  only  know  this  information  if  they 
were  informed  by  law  enforcement  or  other  government 
organizations. 
In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee  on  Technology,  Terrorism  and  Government 
Information of the Senate Judiciary, Howard Beales, director 
of  the  FTC’s  Bureau  of  Consumer  Protection,  provided 
a  characteristic  breakdown  of  the  FTC  Identity  Theft 
Clearinghouse report data (Identity Theft: the FTC’s Response, 
March 12, 2002). At that time, Mr. Beales reported that in 
terms of geographic location, the state of California ranked 
first in number of identity theft victimizations, followed by 
New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois. For victimizations per 
capita (i.e., per 100,000 citizens), the District of Columbia 
was  first,  followed  by  California,  Nevada,  Maryland  and 
New York. When analyzing the report data by victim’s age, it 
was found that those in younger age groups were more likely 
to be victims of identity theft. Victims in their thirties were 
most susceptible to victimization, followed by those between 
18 and 29. Those in their forties comprised the third leading 
group  (see  Table  II-1).  The  reports  involved  a  variety  of 
ways in which the stolen identity was used, including credit 
card fraud and unauthorized telecommunications or utility 
services (see Table II-2). One of the telling statements of 
Mr. Beales’ testimony was that an average of twelve months 
elapsed  between  the  commission  of  the  crime  and  the 
victim’s discovery of it.
Updates  of  FTC  data  from  the  FTC’s  Consumer  Sentinel 
and the Identity Theft Clearinghouse for calendar year 2002 
have  demonstrated  that  key  identity  theft  characteristics 
have  remained  constant  except  for  volume.  Percentage 
distributions  by  age  of  identity  theft  victims  were  nearly 
identical to that in 2001, reflecting a victimization pattern 
somewhat younger than the typical fraud victim. Accounting 
for 43% of the total fraud complaints for 2002, identity theft 
topped the FTC’s list of consumer frauds for the third year in 
a row. (As a percentage of all consumer fraud complaints, 
identity theft has risen from 22% in 2000 to 39% in 2001 to 
43% in 2002). The District of Columbia again was home to 
the highest rate of identity theft complaints followed, once 
more, by California but with Arizona replacing Nevada as 
third highest rate in the nation. The most notable difference 
from 2001 was total volume of identity theft complaints; from 
86,198 in 2001 to 161,819 (Federal Trade Commission, 
January 22, 2003).  
The  Social  Security  Administration’s  (SSA)  Office  of  the 
Inspector  General  (OIG)  also  houses  a  fraud  “call-in” 
reporting  center.  The  OIG  uses  allegations  of  Social 
Security  Number  misuse  as  an  indicator  of  identity  theft. 
The  OIG  reports  a  dramatic  rise  in  these  allegations, 
from approximately 11,000 in fiscal year 1998 to 62,376 
allegations in fiscal year 1999.  The 1999 figure rose to 
Table II-1
FTC Identity Theft Clearinghouse
Report Data -- Age
Age of Victim Percentage
Under 18  2
18-29 26
30-39 28
40-49 22
50-59 13
60 and over  9
Table II-2
FTC Identity Theft Clearinghouse
Report Data -- Uses of Stolen Identity
Crimes Where ID Used Percentage
Credit card fraud 42
Unauthorized telecommunications or     
utility services
20
Bank fraud 13
Personal information for             
employment purposes
9
Fraudulent loans 7
Procurement of government               
documents or benefits
6
Other identity theft 19
Used for multiple crimes 2012
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83,721 in fiscal year 2000 and to 104,103 in fiscal year 
2001 (General Accounting Office, June 2002, GAO-02-
766).  According to the OIG, over 80% of the Social Security 
Number misuses are forms of identity theft. The FTC arrived 
at this percentage by collecting a statistically representative 
sample  of  400  allegations  from  October  1997  through 
March  1999  and  documenting  which  of  the  allegations 
were considered crimes of identity theft (General Accounting 
Office, March 1, 2002). 
 
The GAO also sought out another more creative manner of 
gauging the extent of identity theft by turning to the number 
of 7-year fraud alerts placed on consumer credit files. These 
data were generated by three consumer reporting agencies. 
The fraud alerts serve as warnings of potential fraudulent 
use of an individual’s personal information to obtain credit, 
and advise the credit grantors to take further steps to verify 
the identification of the person attempting to use the credit 
card. The reporting period of the generated data partially 
overlaps with that of the FTC, but was not the same for all 
three agencies, thus diminishing the ability to make across-
agency comparisons. Nevertheless, the data reported by the 
two agencies demonstrates an increase of identity 7-year 
fraud alerts over time (see Table II-3).
Thus the first consumer reporting agency reported a 36% rise 
in the alerts and the second reflected a 53% increase. A third 
consumer reporting agency reported their number of fraud 
alerts as 92,000 for the year 2000, but was unable to supply 
data  for  a  base  year  for  comparison  purposes  (General 
Accounting Office, March 1, 2002).
 
Aggregate  data  from  MasterCard  and  Visa  on  monetary 
loss as a result of identity theft focused on two indicators of 
identity theft: account takeovers and fraudulent applications. 
The GAO reported that the combined domestic identity theft 
losses suffered by the two associations rose 43%, from $79.9 
million in 1996 to $114.3 million in 2000.  Complementing 
this  cost  data,  the  American  Banking  Association  (ABA) 
reported to the GAO that identity theft accounted for 56% 
of all check fraud for community banks (i.e., those banks 
with assets under $500 million) and 29% of all banks in the 
U.S. (General Accounting Office, March 1, 2002, GAO-02-
363).
 
Other data collected on identity theft were largely anecdotal, 
with  some  estimates  coming  from  Los  Angeles,  the  city 
ranked by the FTC Clearinghouse as the third largest city 
for identity theft victimization reports (General Accounting 
Office,  June,  2002).    As  of  May  2001,  the  Los  Angeles 
County  Sheriff’s  Office  reported  2,000  active  cases  and 
the  Los  Angeles  Police  Department  reported  5,000  cases 
of identity theft. Updated information from the Los Angeles 
Police  Department  in  March  2002  revealed  that  identity 
theft cases had risen to an estimated 8,000, 70% of which 
involved utility or cellular telephone fraud. The remaining 
30% involved credit card fraud and check fraud. (General 
Accounting Office, June, 2002).  
 
Because federal law enforcement agencies in the U.S. do not 
specifically track identity theft cases, the GAO depends on 
certain proxies in an attempt to estimate the extent of identity 
theft growth. The most popular of these proxies is “identity 
theft-related crimes.”  For example, the GAO reports that 
the FBI’s arrests for bank fraud rose from 579 in 1998 to 
691 in 1999 and then declined to 645 in 2000. The Secret 
Service reported that they had 8,498 identity theft-related 
cases closed in 1998. That number dropped to 7,071 cases 
closed  in  2000,  possibly  because  of  the  agency’s  policy 
shift to a focus on “high-dollar” loss cases. The amount of 
fraud losses in these cases averaged $73,000 for 1998 and 
$218,000 in 2000 (Stana, June 25, 2002).
 
The GAO also reported that identity theft cases in which 
the  offender  fraudulently  used  identifying  information  of 
a  fictitious  person  was  becoming  pervasive  within  alien 
groups.  As  reported  to  the  GAO  by  the  Immigration 
and  Naturalization  Service  (INS),  the  use  of  fraudulent 
identification documents rose from fiscal year 1998 through 
fiscal year 2000 and dropped in fiscal year 2001 (1998 
–  99,171; 1999 – 120,715; 2000 – 123,537; 2001 – 
114,023). Approximately half of the fraudulent identification 
documents intercepted by the INS were border crossing cards 
and alien registration cards (Stana, June 25, 2002)
 
The  information  presented  above  represents  the  best 
aggregate data on identity theft available at this time. While 
the  information  gleaned  through  GAO  research  provides 
identity theft characteristics, patterns, and volume, caution 
should be exercised in the interpretation of the results.  Data 
on  various  indicators  of  identity  theft  are  currently  being 
collected by several government agencies.  However, they are 
Table II-3
7-Year Fraud Alerts
Consumer Reporting 
Agency
1999 2000 Increase
1 65,600 89,000 36%
2 19,347 29,593 53%13
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working independently and are using disparate definitions of 
identity theft and methods of gathering data on these crimes.   
Therefore, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the extent 
of identity theft and fraud. Is identity theft rising? Based on 
all known indicators, it is rising annually.  However, there is a 
clear need for a centralized agency responsible for collecting 
standardized national data on identity fraud.  This is the only 
way we will be able to measure the size and scope of this 
major societal problem.  
Identity Fraud and Criminal Activity
The use of a false identity created from fraudulent documents 
or a stolen identity (identity theft) in the commission of a crime 
has long been used by criminals and criminal organizations 
to facilitate criminal activities and avoid detection.  As is 
evident  from  the  previous  section,  quantifying  the  impact 
of identity fraud is difficult, but as the statistics in the next 
sections report, terrorism, money laundering and financial 
crimes,  drug  trafficking,  alien  smuggling,  and  weapons 
smuggling are growing concerns for the public and private 
sectors.  Laws and regulations that have been instituted since 
1998 are another indicator of the dramatic increase in the 
widespread use of these methods by criminals and terrorists.
Terrorism
While the fight against terrorism has been longstanding in 
the U.S. and abroad, it is not surprising that the emphasis 
on  terrorism  and  its  control  has  grown  dramatically  since 
the  September  11,  2001  terrorist  attacks  on  the  U.S.  An 
army of law enforcement agencies from national and local 
government  have  embarked  upon  the  challenging  task  of 
identifying  terrorists  and  terrorist-related  activities  through 
coordinated investigations and, in turn, bringing terrorists to 
justice through successful criminal prosecutions. As we enter 
the initial phase of the post 9/11 war on terrorism, obvious 
questions arise regarding the size and scope of terrorism, both 
domestic  and  international,  and  what  amount  of  progress 
enforcement  agencies  are  realizing  in  their  efforts.  Past 
parameters of terrorist-related activities are being constantly 
reset to adapt to their evolving criminal endeavors. 
It is clear that the scope of criminal activities extends beyond 
the core terrorist acts to financial crimes committed to support 
terrorist  operations.  In  Senate  hearings,  the  Federal  Bureau 
of Investigation has underscored the threat posed by identity 
fraud and Social Security fraud engaged in by terrorists in order 
to  obtain  employment,  access  to  secure  locations,  driver’s 
licenses and bank/credit card accounts, all for the purpose 
of financing their criminal activity. The FBI’s Terrorist Financial 
Review Group has accelerated its aggressive pursuit of terrorist 
groups by collaborating with the Social Security Administration 
in the investigation of SSNs identified through past terrorism 
investigations and by widening the traditional scope of terrorist 
investigations. Such investigations now include the targeting of 
fraud schemes committed by loosely organized groups who use 
the proceeds to fund terrorist groups (Lormel, July 9, 2002).  
As with attempts to gauge the extent of other crime areas, an 
understanding of the breadth of terrorism relies upon statistics of 
enforcement actions. For several reasons, including definitional, 
exact numbers of terrorist/terrorist related arrests, prosecutions 
and  convictions  have  been  hard  to  discern.  However, 
research conducted through the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University paints a revealing 
portrait of terrorist enforcement conducted through the U.S. 
Department of Justice, and of its successes and deficiencies. 
TRAC analysis of DOJ referrals for criminal prosecution for 
suspects of international terrorism revealed that such referrals 
ranged between 57 and 83 referrals per month for the study 
period of 09/01-3/02. Referrals for domestic terrorism initially 
peaked  in  October  of  2001.  By  March,  2002  there  were 
118 referrals. (See Table II-4.) The referrals themselves were 
fairly evenly spread throughout the nation, accounting for 87 
federal districts. At least 10 terrorism suspects were referred for 
prosecution from 28 districts, representing every region of the 
U.S. The top international terrorist case referrals were clustered 
around Washington DC (Virginia East – 47; Maryland – 36; 
and the District of Columbia – 33), California East (Sacramento 
– 28), Iowa North (Cedar Rapids – 22), and Michigan East 
(Detroit – 20). The top regions for domestic terrorism referrals 
were  North  Carolina  West  (Asheville  –  68),  Virginia  East 
(Alexandria – 29), and Tennessee Middle (Nashville – 22). 
Table II-4
TRAC Analysis of DOJ Referrals
9/01 10/01 11/01 12/01 1/02 2/02 3/02
International Terrorism 85 77 57 57 83 76 71
Domestic Terrorism 45 90 79 41 39 46 11814
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Monthly  numbers  of  prosecutions  and  convictions  for 
terrorism lag behind the rise in referrals for the September 
2001-March 2002 period.  At the time of the TRAC report, 
federal prosecutors had acted upon one third (328 out of the 
total 945 referrals for domestic and international terrorism). 
At the time of the report 185 cases had been disposed of, 
with only 20 of them ending in conviction. Median sentences 
on  terrorist  case  referrals  for  this  period  were  3  months 
for domestic terrorist cases and 5 months for international 
terrorist cases. These represent cases that have made their 
way  relatively  quickly  through  the  criminal  justice  system, 
such as immigration, ID and visa violations (TRAC, June 17, 
2002).
Despite the fact that the Department of Justice’s Executive 
Office for U.S. Attorneys’ definition of terrorism emphasizes 
actions furthering political goals through force or threat of 
force, many criminal charges for the six month study period 
did not involve such acts. Thirty-three different lead charges 
were  reported  in  connection  with  international  terrorism 
cases. The most common charges involved terrorism of an 
unspecified  nature  or  supplying  support  to  terrorism,  but 
were  frequently  declined  by  prosecutors.  Cases  with  lead 
charges of fraud and misuse of identifying documents, visas 
and passports were the next largest group, most of which 
were  taken  to  court  by  prosecutors  rather  than  declined. 
These  types  of  cases  also  comprised  the  largest  group 
– approximately one-third of the total of domestic terrorism 
cases referred. 
The most dramatic change for types of terrorism cases can 
be seen when comparing the composition of charges filed 
for the six-month study period with the previous five years. 
The  most  common  charges  for  international  terrorism 
from the beginning of 1997 through September 11, 2001 
were kidnapping, murder, and hostage taking. The most 
common charges for domestic terrorism cases during this 
period  were  the  importation  and  storage  of  explosives. 
The most common terrorism charges from September 12, 
2001 through March 2002 involved fraud.  From 9/12/01 
through 3/02, in 39.9% of the combined international and 
domestic terrorism cases, the lead violations were general 
fraud/false  statements  (18  USC  1001).    Such  charges 
made up only 4.8% of the federal charges for terrorism 
(combined international and domestic) for the preceding 
five year period. Other fraud categories that evidenced a 
less dramatic rise in lead charges (from the preceding five 
year period) were fraud and related activity – ID documents 
(18 USC 1028) - .9% to 4.4%, and fraud and misuse of 
visa permits (18 USC 1546) – 4.3% to 6%. (Note: Caution 
should be used in the emphasis of this rise since it could 
be the result of isolated cases with multiple defendants and 
since the raw numbers are so low.  Much of this increase 
could be attributed to the March 2002 case involving 66 
Hispanic workers at the Charlotte/Douglas Airport. These 
figures more likely represent a shift in enforcement strategy 
[flexible categorization of what constitutes terrorism] than 
an increase in fraud committed by terrorists). 
Money Laundering
Money  laundering  is  a  crime  problem  area  that  has 
historically  been  associated  with  drug  traffickers’  efforts 
to introduce the proceeds garnered through the sale and 
distribution  of  illegal  drugs  into  the  legitimate  financial 
market. The U. S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) estimates 
that funds laundered for these illegal purposes exceed $600 
billion per year (DEA, 2003). Other estimates for the total 
worldwide  amount  of  money  laundered  range  between 
$600 billion and $1.8 trillion.  This represents between 2% 
and 5% of the world’s gross domestic product. Federal law 
enforcement has been active in attempting to control money 
laundering. The number of defendants sentenced in cases 
with money laundering as the primary sentencing guideline 
rose steadily between fiscal years 1996 and 2001 (see Table 
II-5). 
While drug trafficking remains a primary driving force for 
money  laundering,  the  combination  of  financial  services 
globalization and technological advances has made money 
laundering a growing threat to financial institutions. One 
indicator of this is the pattern of Suspicious Activity Reviews 
(SARs) filed by financial institutions in the U.S.  Between 
April 1, 1996 and November 1, 2002, the top category 
of  SARs  filed  was  BSA/Structuring/Money  Laundering 
(491,988) accounting for 48.2 % of SARs filed during that 
period (Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, February, 2003; 
TSA, 2003). 
Table II-5
Defendants Sentenced in Federal             
Money Laundering Cases 
Fiscal Year Number
1996 843
1997 932
1998 973
1999 1066
2000 1106
  (U.S. Department of Treasury, July 2002)15
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A  report  by  Transaction  Systems  Architects  (TSA)  provides 
insight into recent high profile cases emblematic of money 
laundering’s threat to financial institutions and the diminishing 
public  confidence  in  financial  institutions  suffering  from 
ineffective  money  laundering  detection  programs  and/or 
employee  complicity  with  money  laundering  operations. 
These high-profile cases were reported by TSA as follows.
Bank of New York Victimization  – Starting in February 
1999 and ending in August 1999, a former vice president of 
the Bank of New York and her husband created Bank of New 
York accounts for three companies and facilitated 160,000 
unauthorized  wire  transfers  for  Russian  bank  customers 
totaling over $7 billion. As a result of this case, the Bank of 
New York entered into an agreement with the U.S. Federal 
Reserve  requiring  the  development  of  an  effective  money 
laundering control program to prevent future occurrences 
of this type.
Operation Casablanca – This was a 1998 U.S. Customs 
Service money laundering sting that resulted in the conviction 
of 28 bankers from two of Mexico’s largest banks. Part of 
the money laundering operation involved 13 wire transfers 
made by the head of the Miami office of Banco Industrial de 
Venezuela totaling $4.1 million.
Noncompliance  Cases  –  These  cases  involve  banks 
falling  out  of  compliance  with  government  regulations  to 
combat money laundering. Between April 1999 and April 
2000,  the  U.S.  Treasury  Department’s  Financial  Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCen) imposed penalties on nine 
banks for noncompliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) 
requirements totaling more than $1.3 million.  Among the 
nine was Sunflower Bank, N.A. of Salina, Kansas, which had 
improperly filed 1,900 Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs). 
While aggregate data on the use of identity theft and fraud in 
money laundering is not available, it is not too large a leap 
of faith to assume that the perpetrators did not always use 
their true identity – having either stolen one or procured and/
or produced fraudulent documents to facilitate the money 
laundering and financial crime process.
Drug Trafficking, Alien Smuggling, Weapons 
Smuggling
These  crimes  are  all  facilitated  by  identity  fraud.    Once 
again,  statistics  compiled  in  these  areas  do  not  include 
identity fraud and/or theft as a separate category.  However, 
it is clear from several cases that the use of identity fraud 
makes smuggling much easier.  As Rand Beers, Assistant 
Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, stated in his testimony before the Senate Committee 
on  the  Judiciary  Subcommittee  on  Technology,  Terrorism 
and  Government  Information,  “Both  groups  [smugglers 
and terrorists] bring corrupt officials whose services provide 
mutual  benefits,  such  as  greater  access  to  fraudulent 
documents, including passports and customs papers…Both 
groups  make  use  of  fraudulent  documents,  including 
passports and other identification and customs documents to 
smuggle goods and weapons.”  
Drug  trafficking  is  cited  by  agencies  such  as  the  Office 
of  National  Drug  Control  Policy  (ONDCP)  and  the  U.S. 
Customs Service as a crime problem that is growing without 
abatement. ONDCP estimates that the annual cocaine flow 
through the Transit Zone (encompassing the Gulf of Mexico, 
Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean, is more than 
500 metric tons annually, 80% of which is smuggled by non-
commercial maritime conveyances. ONDCP reports that the 
proportion  of  these  conveyances  that  are  “go-fast”  boats 
(i.e., small, high speed smuggling boats invisible to radar) 
has increased substantially since 1995. Smugglers hold the 
competitive edge over interdiction vessels, resulting in an 
estimated 90% smuggling success rate for go-fast deliveries 
(ONDCP , January, 2002).
It is difficult to determine the amount of narcotics actually 
smuggled into the U.S. each year. However, amounts seized 
by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Customs Service provide 
an  indication  of  the  enormity  of  problem.  In  fiscal  year 
2001, the U.S. Coast Guard reported a record year for drug 
seizures; 138,393 pounds of cocaine and 34,520 pounds 
of marijuana. 
Individual narcotics smuggling enforcement operations have 
underscored the gravity of the drug smuggling problem. In 
2000, Operation Journey, a multinational enforcement effort 
conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
the U.S. Customs Service, and the Joint Interagency Task 
Force East ended a Colombian drug trafficking operation. 
The  operation  used  commercial  vessels  to  smuggle  vast 
amounts of cocaine into 12 countries, primarily in North 
America and Europe. Over 16 tons of cocaine were seized 
by authorities. 
In its report to Congress in May 2000, the GAO detailed 
the growing threat of alien smuggling. This threat primarily 
emanates  from  two  types  of  smuggling  organizations: 
“blue collar” smugglers and “white collar” smugglers. The 
blue collar smugglers consist of large numbers of Mexican 
nationals operating along the southwest border. White collar 16
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smugglers  charge  higher  fees  for  their  services,  operate 
out of countries other than Mexico, and have more of an 
international  scope.    Alien  smuggling  conducted  by  both 
groups  is  on  the  rise.  The  International  Organization  for 
Migration  estimates  that  approximately  4  million  of  the 
100 million migrants worldwide have either been smuggled 
or  trafficked  (GAO,  May  2000;  Finckenauer  &  Schrock, 
2000).
The GAO has reported that the number of apprehended 
aliens  smuggled  into  the  U.S.  rose  almost  80%  between 
the fiscal years of 1997 and 1999. Data compiled by the 
Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service  (INS)  revealed 
that the number of illegal aliens apprehended attempting 
to enter the U.S. increased from about 138,000 in 1997 
to 247,000 in 1999. Fourteen percent of the 1.6 million 
illegal  aliens  apprehended  by  the  Border  Patrol  in  fiscal 
year 1999 were found to have been smuggled compared 
to 9% (of 1.4 million) in fiscal year 1997. The GAO has 
also cited the rising number and proportion of illegal aliens 
apprehended from countries other than Mexico as a sign 
of the increasingly serious nature of alien smuggling (These 
aliens are said to be more reliant on organized smugglers). 
Such aliens apprehended rose from 58,000 in fiscal year 
1997 to 81,000 in fiscal year 1999 (GAO, May 2000).
Central  America  has  been  recognized  as  an  important 
source and transit point for illegal immigration. According 
to INS’ El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), Central American 
countries are home to 10 of the top 11 individuals smuggling 
aliens across the southwest border. It is unclear how many 
alien  smuggling  operations  exist,  but  it  is  estimated  that 
there are up to 300 such organizations in Mexico and up 
to 50 in Toronto, Canada.  (Estimates are that the Toronto 
organizations  transport  5,000  aliens  into  the  U.S.  each 
year). The INS views organized crime groups in Colombia, 
Nigeria, Albania and Russia as future sources of increasing 
alien smuggling. Special areas of concern are the smuggling 
of Russian prostitutes and People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
nationals. The number of PRC nationals apprehended by the 
Coast Guard quadrupled from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 
1999 – 240 to 1,100 apprehended (GAO, May 2000). 
The INS sees the increasing use of fraud by alien smugglers 
as a critical problem. Alien smugglers are said to be using 
fraudulent documents to obtain immigration benefits (e.g., 
permanent  residency  and  work  authorization)  for  aliens 
smuggled  into  the  United  States.    Smugglers  have  taken 
advantage of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) which 
allows nationals from some countries to enter the U.S. with 
only a valid passport.  Smugglers have used both counterfeit 
and  genuine  passports  from  VWPP  countries  to  smuggle 
non-VWPP nationals. (A common problem here has been 
PRC  nationals  at  U.S.  ports  of  entry  using  high-quality 
Japanese passports). Lost or stolen passports are particularly 
problematic because, being genuine, fraudulent use is hard 
to detect. The elimination of visa policies in other countries 
is  also  a  facilitating  factor  for  alien  smuggling-  related 
fraud. The INS estimated that in November of 1999, at least 
100,000 VWPP passports were reported lost or stolen. The 
INS  attributed  the  increase  of  the  apprehension  of  Polish 
nationals (70 in fiscal year 1997, to 231 in fiscal year 1999) 
to the elimination of Mexico’s visa policy for Poland (GAO, 
May, 2000).  
The thorniest problem for INS is the fraudulent representation 
of U.S. employment for aliens. Alien smugglers have become 
active in creating fictitious companies for which the aliens 
would ostensibly work. Such fraud was discovered in over 
90% of INS’ analysis of 5,000 L-1 visa petitions, making it, 
as characterized by GAO interviews of INS senior managers, 
“the new wave in alien smuggling.” (GAO, May 2000, page 
12).
Effectively detecting the smuggling of weapons into the U.S. 
has become an especially elusive goal of the U.S. Customs 
Service due, in large part, to the increasing volume of people 
and conveyances crossing our borders.  The U.S. Customs 
Services processed a total of 415 million pedestrians and 
passengers  and  130  million  conveyances  in  fiscal  year 
2002. (Processed conveyances include passenger vehicles, 
trucks,  private  and  commercial  aircraft,  and  small  boats 
and  vessels).  Unable  to  inspect  all  but  a  small  portion 
of  entries  into  the  U.S.,  Customs  officials  rely  heavily  on 
telltale smuggling signs and tips by informants to guide their 
enforcement efforts. In fiscal year 2002, U.S. Customs was 
able to focus such efforts on the serious problem of weapons 
smuggling  and  seize  39,643  firearms  from  weapons 
smugglers. However this is estimated to be only a fraction 
of the total number of firearms that pass under Customs’ 
radar (U.S. Customs, 2003; Richey & Blair, June 3, 1998). 
Enforcement gaps were emphasized in a much-publicized 
experiment simulating nuclear smuggling conducted by the 
Natural Resources Defense Council and ABC News in which 
a 15-pound cylinder of depleted uranium was transferred 
undetected  from  the  U.S.  to  Austria,  Hungary,  Romania, 
Bulgaria, Istanbul and back to the U.S. (Natural Resource 
Defense Council, September 11, 2002). 
United  States  law  enforcement  officials  have  currently 
targeted the smuggling of military material from the U.S. to 
other countries as a grave threat to international security. 17
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The new Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  successor  to  the 
former U.S. Customs Service criminal investigations office) 
has made the prevention of the illegal exportation of U.S. 
technologies and weapons systems to terrorist organizations 
and other U.S. adversaries a high priority (Solomon, March 
4, 2003).
Recent  cases  illustrate  how  diverse  the  illegal  exportation 
of  U.S.  technologies  and  weapons  systems  are  both  in 
terms of geographic destination and the types of material 
smuggled.  One  investigation  in  New  York  led  to  the 
disruption  of  a  scheme  to  smuggle  helicopter  machine 
parts and military equipment through Switzerland to Iran. In 
December of 2002, an investigation in Connecticut foiled 
a plot to smuggle a military radar system into Bangladesh 
and  another  investigation  in  Milwaukee  stopped  three 
companies  from  exporting  parts  for  F-4  and  F-15  fighter 
jets  and  military  helicopters  into  Iran.  In  February  2003, 
four  individuals  and  three  companies  were  indicted  for 
attempting to export military equipment to China.  Also in 
February 2003, Raytheon Corporation, the manufacturer of 
the Patriot missile, paid $25 million to the U.S. government 
for attempting to export sensitive communications equipment 
to Pakistan (Solomon, March 4, 2003)    
The targeting of illegal exportation of U.S. technologies and 
weapons systems continues with the Bureau of Immigration 
and  Customs  Enforcement’s  “Shield  America,”  in  which 
heightened  awareness  has  led  to  more  than  5,700  U.S. 
companies  and  sellers  of  weapons  technology  being 
contacted.  The  new,  enhanced  enforcement  strategy  has 
widened  the  scope  of  focus  beyond  halting  exports  to 
banned countries, to include situations in which Americans 
permit themselves to be duped into selling sensitive military 
equipment without concern for the weapons’ final destination 
(Solomon, March 4, 2003).
Conclusion
 
Identity fraud has become the enabling agent -- in effect, the 
catalyst -- for financial crimes, terrorism, money laundering, 
and  drug  trafficking,  alien  smuggling,  and  weapons 
smuggling.  Our ability to address the problem is curtailed 
by the lack of any reliable, organized reporting system that 
accurately reflects all reported identity fraud, across agencies 
and jurisdictions, as well as international borders.  While 
parts of the puzzle have been assembled from a variety of 
public agencies and private enterprises, the information is 
not comprehensive, nor is it shared through the use of a 
central database.  Future studies, building on existing ones 
such as the September 2003 identity theft survey, will be 
needed to estimate the size and scope of identity fraud and 
its financial impact as a core facilitator of several types of 
crime.  In addition, a reporting system and the ability to 
share it among all involved agencies and countries must be 
developed.
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Identity fraud provides criminals and terrorists with the 
tools they need to remain anonymous, gain access, 
avoid detection, and transfer resources.  There are many 
organized crime groups around the world perpetrating 
numerous violent and heinous crimes, most of which are 
supported by identity fraud.  Several reports on organized 
crimes, such as Europol’s report on organized crime in 
the European Union, the Library of Congress report on 
Asian organized crime in Canada, and the International 
Crime Threat Assessment, make note of the role of false 
documentation.  “Terrorists and organized crime groups 
are also suspected of cooperating with each other to 
obtain forged documentation for identification and travel” 
(Library of Congress, 2003 July, p. 36).  ”Supportive 
crimes are also essential.  The primary types of crime 
discussed above [drug trafficking, illegal immigration, 
human trafficking, commodity smuggling, etc.] cannot 
really be viewed in isolation from supportive activities 
such as document forgery” (Europol, 2002 October 3, p. 
14).  “Traffickers, however, also use fraudulent documents 
to obtain genuine travel documents or use altered or 
counterfeit documents to move the women and children” 
(International Crime Assessment, 2000 December, 
Chapter II, p. 11). Diagram III-1, the identity fraud 
process, depicts the overall process from the procurement 
of fraudulent or stolen identifiers to the end result of 
criminal or terrorist activity.  Each phase is described 
below.
Phase I:  Procure Fictitious or Stolen Identifiers
The identity fraud process begins with an individual creating a 
new identity, often using fraudulent identifiers or by assuming 
another person’s identity (identity theft).  Fraudulent  identifiers 
allow the procurement of a fraudulent breeder  document, 
such as a passport, birth certificate, driver’s license, or a 
Social Security Number.  Internet supported false documents 
or ones provided by a counterfeiter or forger open the doors 
to bona fide identifiers and breeder documents.  A breeder 
document  is  a  single  fraudulently  procured  document, 
such as a driver’s license, which provides the information 
necessary  to  procure  additional  fraudulent  documents.   
Unlike  documents  obtained  through  the  use  of  a  stolen 
identity, there is no victim who may become aware of and 
report the theft, possibly leading to the apprehension of the 
criminal.
These documents are easily acquired by accessing various 
Internet sites, engaging corrupt officials, and/or accessing 
the counterfeit document underground.  Detailed guides 
are available in how-to books and on the Internet for those 
who want to make their own false documents. Criminals 
use the Internet to distribute and sell fraudulent identifiers, 
fraudulent  documents,  and  stolen  identities.  The  Senate 
Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations  completed 
a  report,  “Phony  Identification  and  Credentials  via  the 
Internet,”  in  February  2002.    Their  investigation  found 
numerous  websites  that  can  provide  false  identification 
documents through several methods, including mail order 
purchase  of  such  documents,  purchase  of  a  computer 
template  for  at-home  production,  and  free  computer 
software that can be used by any number of people any 
number of times to produce or create realistic, but false, 
identification.  Their findings include:
…many Internet sites offer a wide variety of 
phony identification documents, some of which 
are of very high quality and include security 
features commonly used by government agencies 
to deter counterfeiting.  These include driver’s 
licenses from all 50 States, birth certificates, 
Social Security cards, military identification 
cards, student identifications, diplomas, press 
credentials, and Federal agency credentials 
such as those used by the FBI and CIA.  The 
Subcommittee also found products such as 
Social Security Number generators, bar code 
generators, and instructions for creating 
holograms….the Internet has played a leading 
role in fostering the manufacture and the sale 
of high quality false identification and has made 
these products available to a vast customer base 
with virtual anonymity for both the sellers and the 
buyers.  This has, in turn, presented significant 
challenges for law enforcement. (Permanent 
Subcommittee, 2002, February, p. 2)
Europol found the same to be true.  As stated in its 2002 
EU  Organised  Crime  Report,  Public  Version,  “There  have 
also been significant developments in the area of computer 
and printer technology systems, increasing organised crime 
groups’ capacity to produce counterfeit documentation of 
various types” (Europol, 2002 October 3, p. 8).  
Part III
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Procurement of Documents
Once a person has gained access to the country or procured 
fraudulent identifiers, he has the necessary identification to apply 
for fraudulent documents such as a driver’s license.  In the United 
States, a driver’s license is used as the primary verification tool for 
establishing age and residency, and as the quintessential photo 
identification, e.g. for boarding a domestic flight.  A United States 
passport, obtained with a stolen identity, and the identifiers for 
the stolen identity provide the needed information (i.e. date and 
place of birth) to apply for a “replacement” birth certificate or 
Social Security card.  
Other fraudulent documents can be purchased on the “black 
market.”  The Immigration and Naturalization Service conducted 
an investigation in May 2002 in which “they arrested 24 persons 
and seized counterfeit documents and counterfeiting equipment 
May 8 in an operation designed to disrupt the continuing false 
document open-air markets in the Adams-Morgan neighborhood 
of Washington, D. C.”  Operation Card Shark, as it was called, 
netted  “360  phony  alien  registration  cards  (green  cards); 
281  fraudulent  social  security  cards;  70  bogus  employment 
authorization  cards;  and  46  counterfeit  drivers  license  from 
California, Utah, and Florida.” (CommuniQUE, 5/02)
Diagram III-1
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Access to Passports and other Border Documents
Border crossings are made easier by the use of false documents 
such as border crossing cards, nonimmigrant visas, passports, 
and  citizenship  papers.  The  quality  of  these  documents  is 
improving rapidly, making visual detection difficult.  Organized 
crime groups use fraudulent documents to check-in aliens at 
overseas airports and to smuggle them into the countries such 
as the United States and Canada.  Individuals with ties to 
terrorist groups have been found with fraudulent documents 
throughout the world.  According to Paul J. Smith (July 1, 
2001) notable cases in 1999 and 2000 involved a travel 
agency in India that provided fake passports for hijackers of 
an Indian airlines flight, an Arab man arrested in Kuwait for 
attempting to transport fraudulent Kuwaiti citizenship papers to 
Osama Bin Laden, and the founder of the Japanese Red Army 
who used forged passports as he traveled between Japan and 
China.  Fraudulent documents can be obtained through stolen 
blanks, stolen and altered documents, counterfeiting, and by 
using fictitious information on applications., In April of this 
year, undercover federal agents proved that it is not difficult to 
gain entry to the Untied States with such documents.  
Undercover federal agents tested the nation’s 
border security last month by trying to enter the 
United States with fake ID’s after arriving on a 
one-way flight from Barbados.  Offering bogus 
birth certificates, fake driver’s licenses, and 
false names, they easily passed immigration 
inspection…Moreover, this was a re-test.  The 
undercover agents from the U.S. General 
Accounting Office, the investigative arm of 
Congress, had used the same phony documents 
to win passage late last year at the Canada and 
Mexico borders. (COX NEWS, 2003, May 14)
The government is making efforts to increase the detection of 
fraudulent documents and to stop large criminal organizations 
involved in creating and distributing them.  In his October 9, 
2002 testimony to the Senate Judiciary Technology, Terrorism 
and  Government  Information  Subcommittee,  Michael 
Cronin, Assistant Commissioner for Inspection, Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, stated that the use of the State 
Department’s Consolidated Consular Database resulted in 
detecting 108 fraudulent visa holders in the first 
six months [in Miami].  INS Inspectors using this 
data in New York caught an alien trying to enter 
the US on a falsified Russian diplomatic passport. 
In another instance, a 41-year old man was 
discovered using the altered visa of a three-year 
old Brazilian boy (Cronin, 2002 October 9).
In May 2002, the INS reported a six month investigation 
dubbed “Operation Big Man,” in which the INS worked with 
other domestic and international law enforcement agencies 
in order to stop a large scale terrorist-related smuggling ring.   
They arrested several smugglers and document vendors.
Besides the arrests, the investigators also seized 
numerous counterfeit or altered passports, 
four counterfeit Canadian visa foils, and two 
transparencies for making a counterfeit visa 
printing plate for U.S. visas…Another 19 
“customers” were apprehended in connection 
with the bust.  They were in the process of being 
supplied with false passports, visas, and other 
documents.(CommuniQUE, 2002 May)
Phase II: Create Credible Identity and Gain Access 
Having a fraudulent identity provides criminals and terrorists 
with access to many other elements of a credible identity – 
personal identifying documents, bank accounts, government 
entitlements,  and  the  like.    As  these  accumulate,  the 
criminals’ authentic identity becomes more and more difficult 
to discern.    Although they have been acquired with a bogus 
identity, they appear to be official documents.  With a new 
identity,  the  criminals  or  terrorists  can  avoid  detection  by 
officials who are checking credentials, or fool systems used to 
detect fraudulent documentation.  At each subsequent stage 
of the process, the individuals build a more credible identity 
as they collect more fraudulent documents and information is 
placed in a variety of databases.  Ultimately, the criminals or 
terrorists have procured the documents necessary to provide 
them access to money, secure facilities, transportation, and 
whatever else is necessary for them to commit criminal or 
terrorist acts for profit or purpose. Several points of access 
are addressed here and access to others, such as computer 
systems, can be extrapolated from the discussion.
Access to Financial Institutions
Once the criminal has a driver’s license, birth certificate, 
and/or Social Security card, he has established a substantive 
identity and is able to apply for credit cards, open bank 
accounts, and transfer funds.    In a recent case in Queens, 
NY,  17  people  were  indicted  in  an  alleged  mortgage 
scheme.  
Queens District Attorney Richard Brown said 
the defendants are accused of “turning real 
estate closings into a game of Charades in 
which nothing was authentic except the money 
that changed hands.” Prosecutors said the 21
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defendants would first pick a house, choosing 
six one-family homes in Queens, ranging in 
price from $200,000 to $250,000.  They 
would then pose as a buyer and seller, creating 
false bank records, drivers’ licenses and 
deeds, and set up a meeting with a mortgage 
company to obtain authorization for a loan…
When the bank cut a check for the loan…
defendants would divide the money between 
them. (Newsday.com, 5/9/03)
Clearly,  fraudulent  documents  provide  the  necessary 
access to bank transactions.  Bank personnel, especially 
tellers,  are  trained  to  examine  identification,  such  as 
driver’s  licenses.    If  a  driver’s  license  is  sufficient  for 
proving identity, then there is no defense against fictitious 
documents.  
Access to Federal Entitlement Programs
The U.S. Chief Financial Officer Council released a report 
in  November  2002  entitled,  “CFO-PCIE  Improper  and 
Erroneous  Payments  Work  Group  Sub-Work  Group  on 
Indicators Final Report on Indicators,” which focuses on the 
techniques used to identify erroneous payments, indicators of 
erroneous payments, and limitations to the identification and 
prevention of such payments.  One category of indicators 
is potential fraud.  Listed in that category are “False claims, 
False or duplicate SSNs, False residence/ business address, 
Fictitious  identity/non-existing  business.”    Identity  fraud  is 
definitely  a  factor  in  the  receipt  of  erroneous  entitlement 
payments.    Also  evident  in  that  report  is  the  need  for 
information sharing and data collection.  The following are 
listed as limitations to detecting and preventing fraudulent 
activity.
Limitations on data sharing.  Data collected 
by one federal agency could often be used to 
independently verify data for another federal 
agency but is not accessible, often because of 
congressionally mandated prohibitions.  For 
example, HUD’s subsidized housing programs 
could reduce improper payments by having 
access to National Directory of New Hires data, 
but HUD is not among the entities specifically 
permitted access to this database.
Limited data collection.  Much useful data is 
not currently collected at all during the course 
of normal program administration, or is not 
stored in a way that it can be retrieved, isolated 
or sorted.  
Inherent conflict between promptness 
and accuracy.  Programs that require very 
quick payment processing, such as emergency 
benefit programs, will invariably sacrifice some 
preventive application review procedures.
Inherent conflict between privacy and data 
collection needs.  Some data that would be 
useful in preventing or detecting erroneous 
payments (Social Security Numbers, for 
example) will not be collected or used because 
of individual privacy or business proprietary 
concerns. (www.cfoc.gov, November 26, 2002)
 
Access to Immigration Benefits Including Employment
Fraudulent  documents  are  presented  to  gain  immigration 
benefits such as employment, naturalization, and permanent 
residency status (green cards).  The indictment of Jessie Issac, 
who ran an immigration consulting business, illustrates how 
fraudulent documents allowed individuals to obtain illegal 
immigration benefits.
The indictment also alleges that Isaac, together 
with associates and various business entities, 
presented and caused to be presented various 
false statements in forms seeking, in some cases, 
H-1B visas, a nonimmigrant visa initiated by an 
employer for a foreign national working in a 
“specialty occupation.” Other false statements 
and documents related to Alien Employment 
Certifications, which enable domestic employers 
to hire foreign nationals, and permit them to 
become permanent residents, if they work in 
fields for which there are insufficient, qualified 
U.S. workers. For example, Isaac submitted 
documents asserting that foreign nationals would 
be employed by one of his purported businesses 
in a specific job, at a specific location, at a 
specific salary, and for a specific length of time.  
(Immigration, September 26, 2002).
Access to Secure Facilities
Senator Max Baucus, Ranking Member of the Committee on 
Finance, in his report on driver’s license fraud, addressed the 
access which a fraudulently obtained driver’s license affords 
a criminal or terrorist.
But why is the issue of identification fraud 
important?  It is worth remembering that 
seven out of the 19 September 11th hijackers 
fraudulently obtained authentic driver’s licenses 22
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through the Virginia Department of Motor 
Vehicles.  They used these authentic driver’s 
licenses to board the planes on that tragic day…
A driver’s license is a commonly acceptable 
form of identification.  It also plays an integral 
role in helping to protect our national security.  
Not only are licenses used to board airplanes, 
they make it possible to re-enter the United 
States, obtain access to government buildings, 
open bank accounts, cash checks and buy 
weapons.  What is most important about a 
driver’s license is the apparent legitimacy it 
establishes (Baucus, 2003).       
Similarly, Ronald Malfi, in his testimony before the Committee 
on Homeland Security, reported that the Office of Special 
Investigations  created  fictitious  identities  and  fraudulent 
documents which they then “tested” to see what access could 
be gained.  They found that:
…counterfeit identification can be used to gain 
access to federal buildings and other facilities.  
In March, 2002, we breached the security of 
four federal office buildings in Atlanta using 
counterfeit law enforcement credentials to 
obtain genuine building passes, which we then 
counterfeited…They then were able to move 
freely throughout the buildings during day and 
evening hours. In April and May, 2000, we 
similarly gained access to numerous federal 
buildings in Washington, D.C., that contained the 
offices of cabinet secretaries or agency heads.
Timeline
The identity fraud process may take as long as two years or 
may be facilitated more quickly by skipping an access phase.   
A “fraudulent” United States passport or driver’s license, for 
example, may be the only source of identification necessary 
to  open  bank  accounts  and  set  up  the  financial  network 
necessary to enable the criminal activity. 
Phase III:  Using a Credible Identity to Facilitate 
Criminal Activity
Terrorism
According to the FBI’s report, Terrorism in the United States 
1999, terrorism is defined by the Code of Federal Regulations 
as “’the unlawful use of force and violence against persons 
or  property  to  intimidate  or  coerce  a  government,  the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance 
of political or social objectives (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).”   
The  Department  of  State  chose  Title  22  of  the  United 
States Code, Section 2656f(d) as the definition of choice 
for its publication Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002.  “The 
term  ‘terrorism’  means  premeditated,  politically  motivated 
violence  perpetrated  against  noncombatant  targets  by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended 
to influence an audience.”  While the definition may vary, a 
crucial factor in recent acts of terrorism is the use of identity 
fraud to open many avenues of infiltration and funding.  In 
the case of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, several of the terrorists 
are alleged to have used fraudulent identification documents 
such as drivers’ licenses, stolen credit cards, fictitious and/or 
temporary addresses, false passports and other fraudulent 
travel documents, and fictitious Social Security Numbers.  
The Justice Department scorecard since Sept. 
11 includes 237 criminal charges lodged 
in terrorism investigations, more than 500 
deportations linked to the Sept. 11 investigation, 
18,000 subpoenas and search warrants issued, 
$124 million in more than 600 bank accounts 
frozen, and 1,228 secret wiretaps and searches 
approved on suspected terrorists or spies. 
(Atlanta Journal-Constitution, May 18, 2003)
On June 3, 2003, two members of a sleeper cell, “Abdel-Ilah 
Elmardoudi, 37, and Karim Koubriti, 24, were found guilty 
of conspiracy to provide material support or resources to 
terrorists, and of conspiracy to engage in fraud and misuse 
of visas, permits and other documents.” (Detroit, June 3, 
2003)  It is reported that a questionable witness in the trial, 
Hmimssa,  said  that  Elmardoudi  wanted  to  get  a  certain 
Algerian into the United States so that he could attend flight 
school.  (The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 4, 2003) 
In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Social Security 
of the House Committee on Ways and Means on November 
1,  2002,  Hon.  James  G.  Huse,  Jr.  Inspector  General, 
Office of Inspector General, Social Security Administration, 
stated, “What has become apparent … in all of our work 
on the national investigation, is that a purloined SSN is 
as useful a tool for terrorists as it is for identity thieves” 
(Huse,  2002).    Dennis  Lormel,  Chief,  Terrorist  Financial 
Review Group, FBI, in his testimony to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Subcommittee on July 9, 2002, stated, “The 
threat  [posed  by  terrorism  and  identity  fraud]  is  made 
graver by the fact that terrorists have long utilized identity 
theft as well as Social Security Number fraud to enable 
them  to  obtain  such  things  as  cover  employment  and 
access to secure locations. These and similar means can be 
utilized by terrorists to obtain Driver’s Licenses, and bank 23
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and credit card accounts through which terrorism financing 
is facilitated”  (Lormel, 2002).
Money Laundering/Financial Crimes
Money  launderers  are  intent  on  taking  money  they  have 
gained  through  illegal  means  and  depositing  it  in  a 
bank or other financial institution, or using it to purchase 
insurance  policies.    When  they  withdraw  the  money,  it 
appears to be coming from a legitimate institution and is, 
therefore, assumed to be “clean.”  Once a bank account 
is  established,  deposits  and  withdrawals  can  easily  be 
made, especially if they are under the “red flag’ thresholds.   
Insurance policies can be purchased and used as mutual 
funds, as in the Operation Capstone case.  By over funding 
them, the criminals are then able to withdraw the majority 
of the money they invested as “clean funds.”  Clearly the 
ease with which an identity can be created contributes to 
money laundering schemes.  While the U.S.A. Patriot Act 
requires financial institutions and insurance companies to 
verify the identities of their customers, a criminal can still use 
fraudulent documents.  The FBI considers driver’s licenses 
which are issued without adequate identity verification to be 
a matter of concern.  “Criminal threats stem from the fact 
that the driver’s license can be a perfect ‘breeder’ document 
for establishing a false identity. The use of a false identity can 
facilitate a variety of crimes, from money laundering to check 
fraud” (Pistole, 2003). The breeder document provides the 
identity verification and thus, the account or policy is opened 
and the money laundering can begin.  
In a case in Boston in 2002, it became apparent that money 
laundering  and  identity  fraud  can  be  linked  in  another 
manner,  as  well.    According  to  a  December  11,  2002 
article in The Boston Globe, several people were indicted 
on identity fraud, money laundering, conspiracy, and misuse 
of documents.  The ring sold Social Security cards to illegal 
immigrants,  who,  in  turn,  used  the  false  documentation 
to  obtain  legitimate  Massachusetts  driver’s  licenses.  The 
perpetrators sold the Social Security cards for $2,500 and 
subsequently “laundered” their proceeds through banks and 
“front” businesses (Cambanis, 2002). Using false identity as 
the commodity to “earn” money that is then laundered is one 
more indication of the pervasiveness of identity fraud among 
the criminal element. 
Drug Trafficking, Alien Smuggling, Weapons Smuggling
Identity  fraud  is  a  crucial  element  of  alien  smuggling, 
narcotics  trafficking,  and  weapons  smuggling.    As  noted 
in  Part  II,  the  INS  intercepts  many  fraudulent  documents, 
including  border  crossing  cards,  alien  registration  cards, 
and passports. According to a U.S. Department of Justice 
press  release  dated  October  3,  2002,  on  “October  2, 
2002, a United States District Court jury found Mohammed 
Hussein Assadi guilty of thirteen counts of illegally smuggling 
aliens from Iraq to the United States through Ecuador and 
Colombia” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002).  Evidence 
presented in the late 1997 trial showed the following.
Using a loose network of associates, Assadi 
would recruit his “customers” in the Middle East 
or after they arrived in Ecuador, and for fees 
of up to $8,000 per alien would provide them 
with stolen and altered European passports 
– which do not require visas for entry in to the 
United States – and round-trip airline tickets to 
the United States in the names on the fraudulent 
passports. He would substitute the aliens’ photos 
for those of the original passports’ bearers, and 
instruct the aliens to alter their appearances to 
conform to the passports’ nationalities. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2002)
According to Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “There often is a 
nexus between terrorism and organized crime, including drug 
trafficking” (Beers, 2003).  They form symbiotic relationships, 
as the drug smugglers are privy to the terrorists’ weapons 
and military skills, while the terrorists get tips from the drug 
dealers about transfer and laundering illicit funds.  They are 
able to help each other obtain fraudulent documents, such 
as  passports  and  customs  papers,  that  are  necessary  for 
border access.  In a 1998 General Accounting Office report 
on identity fraud, it was noted that the United States Postal 
Service  stated  that  identity  fraud  is  used  to  finance  drug 
trafficking. “Mail theft and credit card fraud activity frequently 
support drug trafficking.  Large amounts of money may be 
obtained through such fraud” (Identity Fraud, 1998, p.37).
In early March 2003, six members of a terrorist cell operating 
in Charlotte, North Carolina were sentenced for racketeering 
and support of Hezbollah.  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms tracked and investigated the case which involved 
a  multi-million  dollar  tobacco  smuggling  ring.    Cigarettes 
were purchased in North Carolina, where the tax per carton 
is fifty cents, and transported to and sold in Michigan, where 
the tax was $7.50 per carton.  The men, of course, kept the 
$7.00 per carton difference.  According to an unidentified FBI 
agent quoted in a U.S. News and World Report article, “Here’s 
a terrorist support cell that sets itself up in America’s heartland. 
They have the ability to move people across borders and give 
them whole new identities. They have access to a constant flow 
of untraced cash, military training, and a network of criminal 24
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contacts  to  get  weapons.  That’s  not 
good news” (Kaplan, March 10, 2003).
  
Management  of  identity  fraud  has 
occurred on several fronts (see Diagram 
III-2).  Legislation and regulation have 
attempted  to  define  illegal  conduct 
regarding the theft of personal identifiers 
and  false  documentation.    Limited 
commercial  information  is  available 
to  authenticate  identities.  Information 
policies  have  been  promulgated  and 
technological  solutions  have  been 
sought.    Education  and  training  of 
government  and  law  enforcement 
personnel  has  increased.    And  finally, 
an  awareness  campaign  has  been 
launched to educate the public, as well 
as the private and public sectors on the 
significant problem of identity fraud.
Laws and Regulations
Current  and  proposed  identity  fraud  legislation  and 
regulation  is  spread  across  several  agencies.    Each 
current law or regulation has a specific intent regarding 
the mitigation of identity fraud, prohibits certain actions, 
and  impacts  upon  certain  agencies  and/or  industries 
(e.g. law enforcement, customs, airports, flight schools).   
Proposed  laws  and  regulations  may  seek  to  amend  or 
modify current ones in order to improve the success rate 
of investigations and prosecutions.  They may also seek to 
address issues that are not currently covered by existing 
laws or regulations.  Part IV discusses these legislative and 
regulatory issues.
Information and Technology
Policy  defining  the  use,  sharing,  and  distribution  of 
information  is  in  the  formative  stages.    Resolution  of 
issues of information sharing, privacy, and integration in 
a trusted system to ensure need to know distribution, as 
well as gaining greater access to domestic and global 
data are critical to managing identity fraud, Section V 
addresses these issues and proposes a model system.
Education, Training, and Awareness
Heightened  awareness  of  the  identity  fraud  problem 
through education, training, and the media has had an 
impact on the growth of identity fraud.  Law enforcement 
and  government  personnel  have  been  trained  in 
visually  identifying  fraudulent  documents.    The  public 
through the media, financial institutions, and non-profit 
organizations  has  received  warnings  and  guidance  on 
identity theft.
Conclusion
The pervasive nature of identity fraud as evidenced by the 
anecdotal cases noted here, as well as many others, will 
continue until a system is in place to control it. The system 
must  be  sophisticated,  easily  implemented,  dynamic  and 
global,  so  that  it  can  be  adapted  to  the  newly  designed 
methods  the  criminals  and  terrorists  use  to  evade  it.   
Unfortunately, devising such a system cannot occur easily 
or  without  challenges.    Sections  IV,  V,  and  VI  continue 
the  discussion  of  the  development,  implementation,  and 
challenges of an effective method of managing the risk of 
identity fraud.
sss 
Diagram III-2
Managing Identity Fraud25
Economic Crime Institute  /  LexisNexis™ 
Laws and regulations are a crucial component of managing 
identity  fraud.    In  order  to  conduct  investigations,  make 
arrests  and  indictments,  and  successfully  prosecute  these 
crimes,  the  laws  and  regulations  must  cover  the  many 
permutations  of  identity  fraud,  alone  and  as  a  means  to 
commit other crimes.  Current domestic and international 
laws  and  regulations  are  spread  across  several  agencies 
and cover many aspects of identity fraud and identity theft.   
Creating a data and information clearing house so that the 
severity of the problem can be measured and analyzed is 
difficult  because  of  this.  Several  of  the  existing  laws  and 
regulations are covered in this section. 
In the United States, the federal legislation that has been 
developed to address the identity fraud problem has focused 
on  two  means  of  risk  mitigation;  first,  the  criminalization 
of  conduct  relating  to  identity  fraud;  and  second,  the 
strengthening of tools designed to authenticate the identities 
of individuals.  Comprising the first group are:  
•  The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 
of 1998 (P .L. 105-318); 
•  The Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 
2000 (P .L. 106-578); and 
•  The Secure Authorization Feature and 
Identification Defense Act (“SAFE ID Act,” P .L. 
108-21, Section 607). 
The second group of laws, concerning identity authentication, 
is illustrated by the following:
•  The Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA PATRIOT 
ACT”)  of 2001; Section 326, Verification 
and Identification; Section 403, Access by the 
Department of State and the INS to Certain 
Identifying Information in the Criminal History 
Records of Visa Applicants and Applicants for 
Admission to the United States; Section 405, 
Report on the Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System for Ports of Entry and 
Overseas Consular Posts and Section 414, Visa 
Integrity and Security.
•  The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry 
Reform Act of 2002 (P .L. 107-173); Section 303, 
Machine-Readable, Tamper-Resistant Entry and 
Exit Documents;
•  The proposed Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act (FACT Act), H.R. 2622; Section 
207, Study on the Use of Technology to Combat 
Identity Theft.
Criminalization of Identity Fraud Activity
Since 1998, there has been a series of three laws enacted 
addressing different aspects of the identity fraud problem.   
Attempting to stem the flow of the ever-increasing numbers 
of Americans being victimized by identity thieves, Congress 
passed  the  Identity  Theft  and  Assumption  Deterrence  Act 
of 1998.  The principal components of this Act were the 
following:
•  It amended 18 USC Section 1028, by adding 
the crime of Identity Theft, rendering it illegal 
for someone who “knowingly transfers or uses, 
without lawful authority a means of identification 
of another person with the intent to commit, 
or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that 
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that 
constitutes a felony under any applicable State 
or local law.”  (Codified at 18 USC Section 
1028 (a) (7)).
•  It defined “means of identification” to 
include, as it relates to a specific individual: 
(A) identifiers such as name, Social Security 
Number, date of birth, official State or 
government issued driver’s license or 
identification number, alien registration number, 
government passport number, employer or 
taxpayer identification number; (B) biometric 
data, such as fingerprint, voice print, etc; (C) 
unique electronic identification number, address, 
or routing code; or (D) telecommunication 
identifying information or access device.  
(Codified at 18 USC Section 1028 (d)(7)).
•  It enhanced the maximum penalty to 20 years 
imprisonment for a violation of 18 USC S1028, 
relating to fraudulent use of identification 
documents, and information, if done (A) to 
facilitate a drug trafficking crime…: (B) in 
connection with a crime of violence…; or 
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(C) after a prior conviction under this section 
becomes final. (codified at 18 USC Section 
1028 (b) (3)).
•  It mandated that the Federal Trade Commission 
establish a centralized procedure for logging 
complaints by victims of identity theft. (P .L. 105-
318, Section 5).
     
The Identity Theft Act was followed by the Internet False 
Identification  Prevention  Act  of  2000.    Designed  to 
address  the  “proliferation  of  websites  that  distribute 
counterfeit  identification  documents  and  credentials 
over the Internet,” the Act rendered this activity criminal 
by  expanding  the  scope  of  the  federal  fraudulent 
identification  document  crime  to  the  “transfer  of  a 
document by electronic means.”  By this Act, Congress 
addressed the law enforcement dilemma of the Internet 
that, notwithstanding its significant benefit, it has become 
a  haven  for  global  crime,  combining  unbounded 
international reach with virtual anonymity.
      
Finally,  last  April,  Congress  passed  the  SAFE  ID  Act  as 
part of the child protection law called the PROTECT ACT.   
Again focusing on the abuse of identification documents, 
Congress  determined  it  to  be  a  criminal  offense  when 
someone  “knowingly  traffics  in  false  authentication 
features for use in false identification documents, or means 
of  identification.”  (Codified  at  18  USC  Section  1028 
(a)(8)).    “Authentication  features”  was  defined  as  “any 
hologram, watermark, certification, symbol, code, image, 
sequence of numbers… used by the issuing authority on 
an identification document, document-making implement, 
or means of identification to determine if the document is 
counterfeit, altered, or otherwise falsified.” (Codified at 18 
USC Section 1028 (d)(1).)  In enacting the SAFE ID Act, 
Congress  recognized  the  technical  sophistication  of  the 
identity fraud perpetrator, who is able to make “desk-top 
published” dummies of breeder documents, such as birth 
certificates  and  driver’s  licenses,  by  faking  or  stealing 
government-issued embossed or foil seals.
Identity Authentication
The  second  category  of  federal  legislation  tackling  the 
identity  fraud  problem  has  involved  mandating,  under 
certain circumstances, the development and use of different   
manners of identity authentication: information, biometrics 
and token-based. An example of an information and token-
based  identity  authentication  solution  is  that  designed  by 
the Federal agencies in response to Section 326 of the USA 
PATRIOT ACT.     
Enacted in the weeks following 9-11, the USA PATRIOT ACT 
was designed to combat terrorism and the various criminal 
activities  associated  with  it,  including  money  laundering 
and identity fraud.  Title III of the Act, entitled “International 
Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism 
Act  of  2001,”  required,  at  Section  326,  Verification  of 
Identification,  that  the  Secretary  of  Treasury  promulgate 
regulations setting forth the “minimum standards for financial 
institutions and their customers regarding the identity of the 
customer that shall apply in connection with the opening 
of an account at a financial institution.”  (Codified at 31 
USC Section 5318 (b)(1)).   Section 326 further required 
that in prescribing the regulations, the Secretary of Treasury 
impose certain “minimum requirements” and  that it take 
into  consideration  an  enumerated  list  of  “factors  to  be 
considered.”   With regard to the minimum requirements, 
the Secretary was obligated to require financial institutions to 
comply with reasonable procedures for:
(A)  verifying the identity of any person seeking to 
open an account to the extent reasonable and 
practicable;
(B)  maintaining records of the information used 
to verify a person’s identity, including name, 
address, and other identifying information; and 
(C) consulting lists of known or suspected terrorists 
or terrorist organizations provided to the 
financial institutions by any government agency 
to determine whether a person seeking to open 
an account appears on any such list.  (Codified 
at 31 USC Section 5318 (b)(2)).
With regard to the factors to be considered by the Secretary 
of  Treasury  in  prescribing  the  regulations,  the  Act  listed: 
“the various types of accounts maintained by various types 
of  financial  institutions,  the  various  methods  of  opening 
accounts, and the various types of identifying information 
available.”  (Codified at 31 USC Section 318(b)(3)).
Following the Congressional mandate, the Department of 
Treasury, through the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN),  developed  with  the  seven  federal  financial 
regulators (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC),  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
System (Board), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) the National 
Credit  Union  Administration  (NCUA),  the  Commodity 
Futures  Trading  Commission  (CFTC),  and  the  Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC)) regulations implementing   
the identity verification requirement of Section 326.  These 
regulations, promulgated as joint final rules on April 30, 27
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2003, require that financial institutions develop a Customer 
Identification  Program  (CIP)  that  implements  reasonable 
procedures to:
1.  Collect identifying information about customers 
opening accounts, comprising at a minimum, 
name, address, date of birth, and a taxpayer 
identification number (e.g. a Social Security 
Number).
2.  Verify that the customers are who they say they 
are.  This can be through documentary means, 
such as a driver’s license, or through a non-
documentary, information means, such as that 
provided by a trusted third party.
3.  Maintain records of the information used to 
verify the customer’s identities.
4.  Determine whether the customer appears 
on any list of suspected terrorists or terrorist 
organizations. (68 Fed Reg. 25090, 25113, 
25131, 25149).  
Financial  institutions  had  until  October  1,  2003  to  fully 
comply with the Section 326 regulations.
 
Significantly,  the  Department  of  Treasury  recognized  the 
difficulty in authenticating the identities of foreigners in its 
October  21,  2002  Report  to  Congress.    There,  Treasury 
specifically found that, 
…there are significant impediments to domestic 
financial institutions’ ability to identify, much less 
verify the identity of, foreign nationals. The wide 
disparity in identification documents, the pervasive 
problem of fraudulent identification documents, 
and the fact that many foreign nationals who 
establish accounts in the United States are not 
physically present here mean that it might not be 
practicable for Treasury to prescribe rigid rules of 
acceptable or unacceptable forms of identification. 
(Department of Treasury, 2002, p. 3)
 
Although  undoubtedly  true,  the  Department  of  Treasury’s 
search for a solution would be greatly enhanced if there existed 
global data, of a type and in a form, used to authenticate the 
identities of U.S. citizens through information-based identity 
authentication solutions.
 
Although  well-intentioned,  the  Section  326  Customer 
Identification  Program  regulations  are  not  sufficiently 
stringent to authenticate an individual’s identity.  By requiring 
only the submission of a document such as a driver’s license 
to establish identity, the regulations are woefully ineffective.   
It  has  been  widely  conceded  that  driver’s  licenses  and 
similar  credentials  are  easily  counterfeited  or  obtained 
fraudulently.  In the absence of reliable credentials, the only 
practical solution must be to employ an information-based 
authentication system.
The other laws imposing requirements for the development 
and  use  of  authentication  tools  to  combat  identity  fraud 
generally focus on the application of biometrics and tokens.   
Most of these laws concern authenticating aliens.  In the USA 
PATRIOT ACT, Section 403(c) required the Attorney General 
and the Secretary of State to utilize the National Institute 
of Standards (NIST), and to consult with the Secretary of 
Treasury,  other  Federal  law  enforcement  and  intelligence 
agencies,  and  with  Congress,  in  the  development  and 
certification of a technology standard:
[t]hat can be used to verify the identity of persons 
applying for a United States visa or such persons 
seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a 
visa for the purposes of conducting background 
checks, confirming identity, and ensuring that a 
person has not received a visa under a different 
name or such person seeking to enter the United 
States pursuant to a visa.
Although Section 403(c) of the USA PATRIOT ACT required 
the  authentication  of  the  technology  standard  within  two 
years,  or  by  October  26,  2003,  more  recently  Congress 
imposed additional requirements on the Attorney General, 
the Secretary of State and NIST, regarding the development 
of biometrics-based authentication of aliens.
On May 14, 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
Entry Reform Act of 2003 was passed.  At Section 303, this 
Act imposed on the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
State the requirement that by October 26, 2004, they issue 
to aliens, “only machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and 
entry documents that use biometric identifiers.”  In addition, 
they  are  obligated  to  establish  “document  authentication 
standards and biometric identifiers standards to be employed 
on such visas and other travel and entry documents from 
among those biometrics identifiers recognized by domestic 
and  international  standards  organizations.”    Finally,  the 
law  required  the  Attorney  General,  in  consultation  with 
the Secretary of State, to install at all ports of entry of the 
United  States  equipment  and  software  to  allow  biometric 
comparison  and  authentication  of  all  United  States  visas 
and other travel and entry documents issued to aliens, and 
passports issued pursuant to the visa waiver program.  28
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Most  recently,  Congress  has  focused  on  biometric 
authentication while undertaking the issues associated with 
reauthorization of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  With the 
support of the Bush Administration, the House has proposed 
a bill containing reauthorization, which also recognizes the 
need to address identity theft.  In the proposed Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, H.R. 2622, the 
sections of Title II, “Identity Theft Prevention,” are designed to 
combat identity theft.  Although most of the sections protect 
or empower the consumer in the credit environment, one 
specific section is designed to enhance identity authentication.   
As written, Section 207, “Study on the Use of Technology 
to Combat Identity Theft,” would require the Secretary of 
Treasury “to conduct a study of the use of biometrics and 
other  similar  technologies  to  reduce  the  incidence  and 
costs of identity theft by providing convincing evidence of 
who actually performed a given financial transaction.”  In 
conducting the study, the Secretary of Treasury is directed to 
consult with the federal banking agencies, the Federal Trade 
Commission, representatives of financial institutions, credit 
reporting  agencies,  federal,  state  and  local  government 
agencies, the biometric industry, and other representatives 
of the general public.  If the bill were to become law, the 
Secretary of Treasury would be required to provide a report, 
based on the study, within 180 days of enactment.
International Laws and Policies on Identity Fraud
In recent years, as in the United States, other countries have 
passed laws criminalizing identity theft.  Again, as with the 
United States, there is very little indication that they have 
focused on the broader problem of identity fraud.  Similarly, 
although some countries provide certain aspects of identity 
authentication, few countries require it as part of the defense 
against identity fraud.
In London, Home Office Minister Beverley Hughes announced 
a new offense to tackle identity fraud on June 18, 2003, in a 
speech at the Combating Identity Fraud Conference.
This new offence will enable the police to crack 
down hard on criminals involved in identity 
fraud.  False identities are commonly used 
by those engaged in organised crime and 
terrorism…The police usually have to rely on 
other linked crimes to get a conviction.  The 
new offence will make it much easier and swifter 
for police to arrest criminals for identity theft as 
they will be able to arrest the criminals for just 
possessing fake or stolen documents (Home 
Office, June 18, 2003).
Home Secretary David Blunkett referred to the same offense, 
which will be part of an amendment to the Criminal Justice 
Bill due to be enacted later this year, on May 12, 2003, when 
he stated,
Passport and driving licence fraud are gateway 
offences to organised crime and terrorism.  Our 
legislation must keep pace with increasingly 
sophisticated criminals and complex crimes 
(Home Office, May 12, 2003).
Home  Office  Minister  Lord  Falconer  stated,  “These 
amendments  send  out  a  strong  signal  that  terrorists  and 
criminals cannot use identity fraud as a route to more serious 
crimes…They give the police the tools they need to stamp 
out abuse of the passport and driving licence application 
systems…” (Home Office, May 12, 2003).
The  United  Kingdom,  much  like  the  United  States,  is 
cognizant of the fact that current laws and regulations are 
not sufficient to combat the increasing problem of identity 
fraud and is role in terrorism, organized crime, and financial 
crimes.  The new amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill 
are an effort to improve the laws and give law enforcement 
the power necessary to investigate identity fraud cases.  The 
identity fraud proposals would allow police to arrest persons 
in possession of suspect documents immediately, rather than 
issue them a court summons for a later date. 
The European Union does not have a statute that explicitly 
addresses identity fraud.  The Commission of the European 
Communities is of the view that safeguards provided by the 
1995 Privacy Directive and the 1997 Privacy Directive for the 
Telecommunications Sector adequately safeguard personal 
information (2002 OJ C 301).  Further, the Commission 
considers computer access of consumer personal data and 
credit card numbers to be punishable under its Cybercrime 
Convention (Id.).  Some individual European countries have 
laws governing identity fraud.
In the Netherlands, forging identity documents and conviction 
thereof, can result in a five year sentence.  The Netherlands 
police maintain a large database of lost or stolen identity 
documents, called the Verification of Identity System (VIS).
Details of around six million documents are held 
on the central database.  Details are recorded 
for identity documents (mostly driving licences 
and passports), which have been reported lost 
or stolen.  Whilst the majority of documents 
recorded are Dutch, details of documents issued 29
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in other countries are also held.  Details of 
deaths are also held in case someone tries to 
assume the identity of a deceased person.  The 
database can also be used to validate some of 
the data recorded on a document.  This includes 
validating the “country code” and the number of 
digits used on a passport (Cabinet Office, July 
2002, p. 38).
Belgian  citizens  are  required  to  carry  government  issued 
identity cards.  They also must register their address with the 
government and are subsequently visited by a government 
official to validate that the address is real.  (Cabinet Office, 
July 2002, p. 39)  In Finland, national identity cards are 
optional, but each person has a government number which 
holds governmental information about the person and which 
is stored in a database that government departments use to 
verify information and identity duplicate requests.  (Cabinet 
Office, July 2002, p. 40)  Denmark also maintains a database 
of its citizens, who each have an identifier number.  Danish 
citizens are required to notify the government of a change 
of address so that the database can be updated. (Cabinet 
Office, July 2002, p. 40)  The Republic of Ireland has signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Kingdom 
for  increased  sharing  of  document  information.  (Cabinet 
Office, July 2002, p. 41)  In France, “Legal restraints forbid 
the exchange of personal information between government 
departments  and  private  and  public  sector  organisations 
– unless a judicial investigation is underway, in which case 
disclosure of information is mandatory” (Cabinet Office, July 
2002, p. 41).
Canada prohibits identity fraud-related crimes via a plethora 
of statutory provisions, including personating a police officer 
(Criminal Code of Canada [CCC], § 130), theft (CCC § 
322), credit card forgery or falsification (CCC § 342.01), 
false pretence or false statement (CCC § 362), telegram 
in false name (CCC § 371), fraud (CCC § 380), personation 
with intent (CCC § 403), personation at examination (CCC § 
404), and acknowledging instrument in false name (CCC § 
405).  Canada does not have a national identifier that can be 
compared to the American Social Security Number.  Citizens 
can apply for and obtain a Social Insurance Number (SIN), 
but those numbers have been used fraudulently in numerous 
cases.  Proof-of-identity is required and it is illegal to apply 
for a second SIN. The government has taken steps to ensure 
that  those  checking  identity  documents  are  well-schooled 
(Cabinet Office, July 2002, p. 37).  In November 2002, 
Immigration Minister Denis Coderre called for a national 
debate  on  the  issue  of  instituting  a  Canadian  national 
identity card.  In a speech before the Standing Committee 
on Citizenship and Immigration on February 6, 2003, titled 
“Why Discuss a National Identity Card?” he stated, 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the 
United States on September 11, 2001, identity 
has taken on new prominence in countries 
around the world. Canada has been no different. 
Canadians have come to see the ability to 
establish identity as an important element of 
personal and collective security.  And while 
the new focus on a positive proof of identity is 
partially rooted in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks, other forces are at play.  Identity theft 
is seen as a serious and growing problem in 
Canada.  Yet, as we sit here today, there is no 
specific crime of identity theft in the Criminal 
Code (Coderre, February 6, 2003). 
Conclusion
As noted in Parts II and III, a means of managing identity 
fraud is essential.  Unfortunately, identity fraud is pervasive in 
our society; if left unchecked, it will erode personal safety and 
economic  soundness.  A  comprehensive,  shared  reporting 
database of information regarding identity theft and fraud 
cases  is  one  step  in  the  management  of  identity  fraud.   
Another step is the promulgation of laws and regulations, 
both domestic and globally, that will lead to the enforcement, 
detection, and prosecution of criminals using identity fraud 
as a stand alone crime or as a facilitator of any number of 
other crimes.  While the United States has several laws and 
regulations in effect, they tend to deal with the problem in 
a piecemeal fashion, rather than attacking the big picture.   
Section 1028 of Title 18, which has been amended several 
times, attempts to cover all aspects of producing and using 
fraudulent  documents,  but  does  not  address  the  need  to 
authenticate identity documents.  The USA Patriot Act does 
a more thorough job of requiring systems for identification 
verification and for sharing identity information.  However, 
regulations  such  as  the  Customer  Identification  Program 
are watered down and reduce effectiveness. Some of the 
proposed legislation, notably the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003, continues the trend of addressing 
small  pieces  of  the  problem,  which  will  not,  in  and  of 
themselves, be effective in reducing identity fraud as a crime 
facilitator.
Federal  and  state  legislative  bodies  must  ensure  that 
investigators  and  prosecutors  are  armed  with  adequate 
weapons  to  apprehend  and  punish  those  who  commit 
identity  fraud.    As  the  trend  toward  greater  information 30
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sharing and the use of relational databases becomes more 
prevalent, the ability of law enforcement and private sector 
fraud investigators to uncover identity fraud schemes through 
data analytics and link analysis technologies will become 
critical.  A critical component of those technologies is the 
ability  to  make  connections  between  seemingly  unrelated 
events through the use of common identifiers, for example, 
Social Security Numbers.  That ability would be significantly 
impaired by the adoption of certain pending legislation and 
regulations, such as preventing the use of Social Security 
Numbers  for  commercial  or  government  transactions  or 
requiring  a  unique  individual  identifier  for  health  care 
records.            
This problem is not unique to the United States; countries 
around  the  world  are  grappling  with  legislation  that  will 
protect privacy and security, but at the same time prevent 
the  use  of  identity  fraud.    Some  countries,  notably  the 
Netherlands and Finland, have developed databases with 
information on stolen identity documents and/or personal 
information that are shared among government agencies.   
Sharing  information  within  and  across  borders,  while 
maintaining  a  balance  among  risk,  privacy,  and  security, 
presents a big, but perhaps not insurmountable, challenge 
to reducing identity fraud.  Meeting this challenge is essential 
to successful global commerce.
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As is evident from the preceding sections of this paper, identity 
fraud is a problem that needs to be stopped – easy to say, 
tough to accomplish.  Identity fraud is pervasive in our society 
today  and  easily  cuts  across  many  different  criminal  and 
terrorist activities.  Since the beginning of civilization there 
has been a crime problem and society has continually had 
to adapt its methods of preventing and detecting it, as well 
as swiftly bringing perpetrators to justice.  However, as our 
society’s knowledge and use of technology has grown and 
improved, a cultural change has taken place.  At one time, 
not that many years ago, a breeder document, i.e., a driver’s 
license,  meant  something;  it  could  be  used  to  establish  a 
person’s identity with little or no question.  Now, technology 
has  enabled  criminals  to  produce  fraudulent  documents 
which can be used to procure legitimate documents – breeder 
documents.    Counterfeit  documents,  such  as  credit  cards, 
used  to  be  easily  detectable;  now  it  is  relatively  easy  to 
produce a counterfeit hologram that passes for the real thing 
most of the time.    The technology and the ability of the 
criminal element to adapt and defeat systems that have been 
put in place by law enforcement, government, and industry 
have made it very difficult to authenticate a person’s identity. 
Furthermore, the lack of significant domestic and global data 
has made it difficult to establish an effective information-based 
authentication system.  Without the ability to make accurate 
assessments of identity, the integrity of our society comes into 
question.  Managing the risk of identity fraud is necessary to 
shore up that integrity.  We need the policy, technology, and 
commitment of government and industry leadership in order to 
return to a time when we can verify, validate, and authenticate 
that a person is who he says he is.
Applying Information-Based Methods to 
Determining Identity 
Risk Management 
The  assessment  of  the  threat  or  harm  to  an  asset  and 
the degree of protection taken to prevent it are the main 
components  of  risk  management.  In  this  case,  the  use 
of identity fraud enables harm or threat to an asset.  For 
example,  it  has  been  shown  that  identity  fraud  facilitates 
terrorism, which is a threat to our national security.  The 
amount of harm that identity fraud can cause (the threat), 
in  terms  of  facilitating  a  terrorist  risk,  must  be  assessed.   
Once that is done, the level of protection needed to prevent 
it is determined.  The assessment of the potential threat is 
balanced against the risk management strategies required to 
protect those assets.
The use of information-based risk management methods for 
credit purposes has been pioneered by the financial services 
industry.    By  performing  credit  reviews  before  approving 
loans  or  granting  credit  cards,  financial  institutions  have 
been able to reduce the risk of bad credit and fraud.  The 
potential losses from credit card fraud or foreclosed loans 
are  assessed  and  protections  are  put  in  place  that  are 
commensurate  with  the  amount  of  money  that  is  at  risk.   
Efforts  to  comply  with  Know  Your  Customer  regulations, 
such  as  those  delineated  in  the  USA  PATRIOT  Act,  have 
spurred the development of new techniques. The process of 
determining or authenticating identity using information can 
benefit from proven risk management methods.  The levels of 
risk management required to support identity authentication, 
verification,  and  validation  are  based  on  several  factors 
including risk, cost, speed of decision making, availability 
of  information,  and  the  sophistication  of  the  individuals/
organizations  making  the  threat.    Generally  speaking,  as 
the  risk  or  threat  increases,  more  sophisticated  methods 
of  risk  management  must  be  employed.    Accordingly,  as 
the risk increases, so does the cost to assess it, as more 
data/information  and  faster  decision  making  is  required.   
The methods of preventing the threat of identity fraud – i.e. 
more sophisticated risk management – must be geared to 
the sophistication of the criminals, whose means of creating 
breeder  documents  and  a  credible  identity  continue  to 
become more complex.
Levels of Risk Management in Determining Identity 
Determining the identity of a person in a routine transaction 
can be as simple as matching two identity documents, e.g. a 
driver’s license and a credit card, to see that the name and 
address are the same.  However, as has been shown, in the 
case of identity fraud, such documents are easily procured 
through  the  Internet,  from  counterfeiters,  or  by  using  a 
fraudulent  document  to  acquire  a  breeder  document.   
Therefore,  other  means  of  determining  identity  must  be 
employed.
Level One: Validation  
Information-based  identity  authentication  begins  with 
validation.  Although it is the lowest level of risk management, 
it  serves  two  important  purposes:    to  determine  if  the 
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identifying information presented by an individual, i.e. the 
identifiers, is not fictitious and to confirm that it conforms to 
an established format.  In checking to see if the information 
is real, that is, not fabricated, a table or schedule of records 
is consulted.  If the identifier provided by the individual, such 
as an address, phone number, or data birth, satisfies an 
existing logic or format then the identifier is considered to 
be “real.”   
Validating an identifier for format involves checking to see if 
the data set presented matches the code or order established 
for  that  particular  identifier.    For  example,  a  MasterCard 
number always begins with the number 5.  A Social Security 
Number’s first three digits are determined by the state in 
which the card was granted.  If a person claims to have been 
born in California, but presents a Social Security Number 
beginning  with  040,  a  number  issued  in  Massachusetts, 
further analysis may be warranted. A question to be asked in 
validating identifiers is, “Is the format or code of a particular 
identifier consistent with the format or code for that particular 
identifier?”  If it is, and if the identifier has been matched, 
then the identifier is validated.
While  validation  provides  an  analyst  with  information  on 
which to base a decision, it has limitations.   If an identity 
fraud perpetrator understands how the system works, he or 
she will be able to produce false identifiers whose elements 
will not be revealed through the validation process. 
Level Two: Verification
Using an information-based system, the next level of identity 
authentication  is  verification.    Verification  provides  a  risk 
analyst with more information on which to base a decision.   
Identity  verification  determines  if  the  identifiers  provided 
by  an  individual  belong  together,  as  distinguished  from 
validation, which examines identifiers in isolation.  Through 
parallel searching of   multiple databases, such as public 
records,  change  of  address,  and  phone  numbers,  the 
accuracy of the identifiers can be determined.  For example, 
if  a  person  supplies  his  name,  address,  phone  number, 
and Social Security Number on an application, a search is 
constructed to confirm whether all four identifiers appear in 
the given combination in several databases. The verification 
process asks the question, “Do the identifiers in the given 
combination  (e.g.  name,  address,  phone  number,  Social 
Security Number) match the data as it appears in multiple 
databases?’’   If the answer is yes, then the identifiers are 
considered verified.  
If  discrepancies  appear  in  the  database  search,  more 
analysis is necessary.  Databases must be evaluated; those 
with the most current, accurate, and encompassing data are 
generally considered better.  However, because of the cost 
associated with using the more comprehensive databases, 
their use has to be balanced against the need for precision 
in the risk assessment process. If the particular risk for which 
the verification process is being applied is low, databases 
with less information, and a corresponding lower cost, are 
sometimes considered sufficient.  Conversely, if the risk is 
extreme,  the  combined  use  of  government,  commercial, 
and industry data may be warranted to manage the risk. 
The determination of which databases are eventually used 
in a given application is often an iterative process requiring 
continuous  monitoring  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  overall 
identity authentication program.
In  both  the  validation  and  verification  processes,  risk 
inherent to an identifier itself can sometimes be determined. 
Checking an identifier against an address, phone number, 
or Social Security Number validation database may unveil 
risk  indicators.    For  example,  if  an  address  matches  a 
prison or a commercial mail receiver, the address would be 
considered a high risk.  If a phone number provided by an 
individual were for a pager or a disconnected line, the risk 
might be considered to be lower by a trained analyst.  If the 
Social Security Number database shows that the number is 
associated with a deceased person or more than one person, 
further management of the risk is essential.
Level Three:  Authentication
Although  somewhat  confusing,  the  third  level  of  an 
information-based identity authentication process is referred 
to as “authentication.” Authentication builds on validation 
and verification.  The primary element of authentication is a 
modeling and scoring engine that is used to help determine 
the probability of the claimed identity of an individual being 
real.    The  authentication  engine  models  and  scores  the 
identification  information  presented  by  an  individual.    In 
the authentication scoring process there are three potential 
scores:  an affirmative score, meaning the person’s claimed 
identity  has  been  authenticated  based  upon  the  rules  set 
for  the  application;  a  negative  score,  representing  an 
unsatisfactory  authentication  score;  and  an  “exception” 
score, meaning the process is inconclusive on authentication, 
usually necessitating further review by the entity applying the 
identity authentication process.
A modeling and scoring engine for identity authentication 
would work in much the same way as a credit model and 
scoring  engine  used  by  financial  institutions.    While    a 
credit scoring engine, determines the level of financial risk 
of an individual, an identity decision engine determines the 33
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authenticity of identity, based on variables, including but not 
limited to:
•  Existing records for that identity (validation)
•  Consistency of internal codes (validation)
•  Given identifier combination across databases 
(verification)
•  Name
•  Name variation/spelling
•  Known aliases
•  Address
•  Phone number
•  Social Security Number
•  Immigration status
•  Date of issue.  (See Table V-1.)
The  identifiers  provided  by  an  individual  are  analyzed  to 
determine which of these variables apply.  The information 
gathered about those variables is then matched against the 
information in several high quality databases and a score 
is assigned. Again, as is the case with a credit score, which 
predicts  the  creditworthiness  of  an  individual,  the  identity 
score  predicts  the  authenticity  of  the  individual’s  claimed 
identity. The prediction is made by comparing the identity to 
similar patterns in an information repository.
 
Authentication is not without challenges.  An identity 
decision modeling and scoring engine must be 
developed based on the process described later in this 
section.  The information against which the variables may 
need to be checked could involve numerous databases, 
some of which are only available from an international 
source.  This is of particular concern when the individual 
claims to be a citizen of a foreign country.  Another 
challenge involves the processing of “exceptions,” when 
further analysis by trained risk analysts is essential.   
Identity Authentication Decision Model
While the process of authentication is logical and may seem 
simple, actually implementing the system is complex.  In some 
cases,  it  includes  building  the  model  to  predict  behavior, 
developing  a  scoring  process,  procuring  data  or  access 
to  data  for  analysis  purposes,  and  the  integration  of  the 
components into a decision system.  
In order to develop an identity decision modeling and scoring 
engine, three steps have to be taken.  In step 1, analysts 
must assess a random sample of documents analyzed to 
identify  aspects  that  relate  to  their  authenticity  and  in  so 
doing, choose the variables against which the information 
Table V-1
Explanation of Identity Decision Model Variables
(This is not an exhaustive list)
Existing records for that identity
Does the information provided match an existing record in 
a database?
Consistency of internal codes
Does the data set match the established code or order for 
that particular identifier?
Given identifier combination across databases
Do the identifiers in the given combination match the 
data as it appears in several databases?
Name
Does the name provided match the records against which 
it is checked?
Name variation/spelling
If there are variations in the name and/or spelling, do 
they meet the criteria for matching, i.e. same address?
Known aliases
Has the name been used as an alias?
Address
Does the address exist?  Is it residential or commercial?  
Is it a correctional facility?
Phone number
Is the phone number active?  Is it for a landline, cellular 
line, or pager?
Social Security Number
Does the number belong to more than one person?  Is 
there any information associated with the number?
Immigration status
Is there an immigration status associated with the identity 
presented in the breeder document?  Does the breeder 
document address match the address provided at the 
time of immigration?
Date of issue
When was the identifier (e.g. Social Security Number) 
issued?  Does it make sense given the age of the person 
supplying the information?34
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on the breeder document is matched and determine the 
decision-making process (analyst knowledge).  In the next 
step, each of the variables is assigned a value (weight) 
based on how strong a predictor it is of a real identity, so 
that the document in question can be scored.  In the third 
step the engine is continuously updated based on ongoing 
outcomes (outputs). 
Diagram  V-1  depicts  how  the  system  is  tested  and 
improved.  New data is introduced to the system.  The 
engine takes the existing model, a data set, and the new 
input, and produces a set of scores for records in near real 
time.  This output is then used by the model to improve 
its decision making ability.  The score is set up to provide 
an authentication of the identity, rejection of the identity, 
or an exception.  A risk analyst then reviews exceptions to 
render a decision.  
The full decision model is presented in Diagram V-2.   A 
document is presented to the system to be scored.  The 
scoring engine, which includes the latest version of the 
model, checks the document against data stored in the 
information  repository  and/or  sends  a  request  from 
the  repository  to  specialized  databases  to  gather  the 
necessary information.  (The system is constructed in this 
manner  because  it  is  not  feasible  or  desirable  to  store 
all the data in one mega database.)  The scoring engine 
scores the data on the document using the model and 
the data retrieved. It therefore uses existing data and past 
outcomes to predict future actions. If the response is ”yes,” 
to authenticate the person or “no,” not to authenticate, 
the message is sent to the entity making the request.  If 
the score falls in the exception range, an analyst reviews 
the output and reports to the entity.  The system uses each 
decision to learn and improve the model.  
The scoring engine must be reviewed and revised regularly 
to ensure that the variables and weight assessed each is 
appropriate.  The validity of the system is crucial in terms 
of it producing fewer false positives and false negatives.   
A  false  positive  decision  is  one  where  the  system  does 
not authenticate the identity when it should.  In a false 
negative  decision,  the  system  authenticates  the  identity 
when it should not.
However, while an identity authentication decision model 
may  be  effective,  its  use  is  dependent  upon  it  meeting 
privacy  and  security  requirements.    The  next  section 
presents a trusted technology solution that adds these two 
features to the identity authentication model.  
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A Trusted System
For a trusted identity authentication decision-making system to be 
accepted, it will require new technology and policy development.   
The trusted system must:
1.  Protect the digital data.
2.  Not store vast amounts of data, but be able to 
gather data when it is required from a vast number 
of domestic and global databases.  (“What kind of 
data should be available and in what format should 
it be shared?”)
3.  Maintain the privacy of the information; responses 
to requests should validate, verify, or authenticate 
the person, but not necessarily include the 
particulars of the data. 
4.  Distribute data on a need to know policy-based, 
technology driven basis – individuals receive 
information based on their status in the system. (“Who 
will have access to the data and for what purpose?”)
5.  Log all activities so that they are auditable in near or 
real time and proper oversight can be maintained.  
6.  Adhere to legal and regulatory standards.
7.  Be technically sound.
Trusted System Example: Radiant Trust™
A trusted identity authentication decision-making system that 
meets the requirements above is currently being developed.  
Building on Radiant Mercury™, a system used by DoD 
and other agencies to share data across security domains, 
Lockheed Martin is developing Radiant Trust, a system that 
provides customized message filters and distribution based 
on message content and rules, e.g. one alert format to the 
INS officer vs. a different message to a station supervisor.
Radiant Trust appears to solve the technical requirements for 
a policy driven trusted system.  It provides the ability to share 
data across different security level domains while maintaining 
the integrity of the higher security classification systems.  Such 
a system allows information to be gathered from domestic 
and global sources, and enhances the protection of privacy 
of individuals. It provides a solution that may alleviate the 
legal constraints on information sharing, while eliminating 
the need to store large amounts of data at one source.  
Even if Radiant Trust can solve the technical issues of such a 
system, there is still a trust factor that must be addressed.  The 
only way such a system will be accepted, and not viewed as 
another “Big Brother” approach, is if there is close oversight 
Diagram V-2
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through a strong audit capability.  All input and output data 
and every user action on the system must be capable of 
being fully audited. 
Information Sharing and Privacy Concerns
As  has  been  discussed  above,  the  more  sophisticated 
levels of risk management require accurate and significant 
amounts of data from a variety of sources.  The sources of 
domestic  data  are  commercial,  private,  and  government 
entities.  In many cases, there is a need for global data as 
well.  In order for effective identity determination to occur, 
the data from these multiple sources must be shared in a 
secure manner that protects privacy.  In extreme risk cases it 
is essential that databases that traditionally are not available 
are made accessible.   Accessibility differs from information 
sharing,  in  that  using  databases  to  match  variables  and 
discern discrepancies in a particular extreme risk situation 
may not require the disclosure of all of the information in 
the database.  In fact, best practices should dictate using the 
minimal amount of data needed to satisfy the level of identity 
authentication required.
Sharing  must  occur  on  many  levels,  including  within  the 
private sector, within the public sector, between the private 
and public sector, and in some cases with global entities. In 
order to accomplish this complex process, issues of privacy, 
trust, and security must be addressed in the context of legal, 
regulatory, and technical issues.  This can only be done in an 
environment where clear privacy boundaries are established, 
strong security exists, and the system is trusted as a result of 
audit and oversight.
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Challenges to Managing Identity Fraud
Easy Access to False Identifiers
The  proliferation  of  Internet  websites,  how-to  manuals, 
and  mail  order  businesses  that  enable  individuals  and 
organizations to create and/or steal identities is seemingly 
limitless.    Many  of  the  laws  and  regulations  that  have 
been  passed  have  been  directed  at  curtailing  access  to 
information and criminalizing such behavior. The effects of 
these efforts have been hard to measure, but the identity 
fraud  problem  does  not  seem  to  have  subsided  as  a 
result.  While the public has been made more aware of the 
possibility of having their identities stolen and thus, have 
begun to take precautions against it, the same is not true 
of identity fraud.   
Recommendations such as eliminating the use of a Social 
Security  Number  or  reissuing  random  numbers,  do  not 
resolve the problem.  The core issue is not an existing or new 
identifier, but the inability to validate, verify, or authenticate 
the identity.    It is costly to add new security features to 
documents, as they provide relief for only as long as it takes 
the criminals to defeat the new system.  Numerous examples 
exist  where  fraud  has  dropped  significantly  after  such  a 
feature is introduced, only to have the criminals defeat it 
in a matter of months. When the hologram was introduced 
on credit cards in 1982, counterfeiting of credit cards was 
reduced  dramatically.    However,  it  was  only  a  matter  of 
time before facsimiles of holograms started to appear on 
counterfeit cards and the resultant losses began to rise.  
 
The emphasis in this area should not be placed on how 
to  reduce  the  information  sources  or  the  availability  of 
purchasing breeder documents.  Rather, the challenge is how 
to render these fraudulent documents ineffective.
Limited Data Analysis and Research 
Our overall ability to answer incisive questions about the 
pervasiveness  of  identity  fraud  in  our  society  is  severely 
handicapped  by  the  lack  of  a  reliable,  organized,  and 
inclusive reporting system, that accurately reflects all reported 
and  detected  identity  fraud,  cutting  across  enforcement 
agencies at each level of government.  Such a system would 
enable government agencies and private enterprises access 
to information, so that trends such as the use of identity fraud 
as a catalyst to other crimes could be identified.  While parts 
of the puzzle have been assembled from a variety of such 
organizations, it remains divided and mismatched.  Federal 
agencies  and  private  organizations  and  corporations  use 
different indicators of identity fraud and do not collaborate 
to present a uniform picture, while state and local agencies 
generally do not collect and/or report the identity fraud cases 
with which they have dealt.  Without consistent, accurate, 
and shared information on identity fraud cases, development 
of a systematic mechanism that enables further research in 
this area will continue to be hampered.
 
The challenge in this area is to develop a strong research 
agenda, based on the classification, collection, and sharing 
of  identity  fraud  data,  which  will  provide  direction  for 
decisions on identity fraud policy.
Limitations on Information Sharing
Identity information data is available from various sources, 
including  commercial,  private,  governmental,  and  the 
international  equivalents  of  each.  Commercial  data 
includes credit reports, which are available for appropriate-
use  purchase.    Data  is  also  available  commercially  from 
companies  such  as  LexisNexis  and  Acxiom  which  offer 
government  and  business  information  solutions.    Private 
information data includes the records held by mortgage and 
credit card companies, which is not available commercially 
and  is  protected  by  laws  and  regulations.  Governmental 
information data includes public records such as birth and 
death certificates and business records, which is available for 
a nominal fee and often without restriction. 
For the most part, these sources do not share their data,  with 
each other or use each other’s data to construct a composite 
or complete picture of a personal or business record.  Even 
within industries, such as insurance, credit card companies, 
and  the  like,  information  sharing  is  limited  because  of 
competition, legal and regulatory prohibitions, and the lack 
of a secure system to facilitate sharing. For the purpose of 
controlling criminal and terrorist activities, greater sharing 
among these entities (commercial, private, and government) 
must occur.  Policies, laws, and regulations to this end must 
be  fully  articulated,  balanced,  and  monitored  to  insure 
compliance.  Additionally, a methodology and technology 
that would allow each entity to grant information requests 
from the others without having to provide an entire data set 
would encourage these groups to cooperate.
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The challenge is to create more sophisticated networks, both 
domestic and global, through which information can be shared 
in a trusted environment and meet the needs of commerce, 
law enforcement, and national security, while enhancing the 
protection of the personal information of law abiding citizens.
Privacy and Information Security
Government  or  commercial  use  of  an  information-based 
authentication  solution  for  managing  an  identity  fraud 
risk  requires  consideration  of  the  privacy  interests  of  the 
individual whose information is being used.  This is not a new 
consideration as laws such as the Privacy Act of 1974 and 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, originally enacted in 1975, 
evidence.  More recently, the regulations under the Gramm-
Leach  Bliley  Act  and  the  Health  Insurance  Portability  and 
Accountability  Act  detail  how  important  societal  interests, 
such  as  fraud  prevention  and  law  enforcement,  can  be 
balanced  with  personal  privacy  interests,  even  when  very 
sensitive personal information, such as financial and health, 
are at issue.  However, in the United States, as distinguished 
from some places like Europe, the commercial acquisition 
and use of other types of personal information, such as most 
identifying information, are largely unregulated.
We in the United States have generally allowed free market 
concepts to dictate the development of best practices in the 
commercial acquisition and use of non-sensitive personal 
information.  As evidenced by the almost universal existence 
of  Internet  privacy  policies,  this  approach  has  worked.   
Also indicative of the success of the U.S. approach is the 
development of off-line privacy policies in the information 
solutions industry.  An example of such a data use policy can 
be found at the LexisNexis web site. 
Critical to the success of commercial privacy best practices 
has  been  the  appropriate  balance  struck  between  the 
need for a particular information solution and the need to 
protect  an  individual’s  privacy  interest  in  the  information.   
To  appropriately  balance  these  interests  is  an  important 
objective in devising identity authentication solutions to meet 
the risks of identity fraud harms.  The success of privacy best 
practices has been achieved where they have adequately 
considered the following factors:
1.  Effectiveness;
2.  Proportionality; and 
3.  Limiting the risk of harm to the individual from 
the use of the individual’s information.
Effectiveness, in the identity authentication process means   
the degree to which an identity authentication solution has 
managed  a  particular  identity  fraud  risk.      For  example, 
in  the  credit  card  issuance  environment,  where  the  use 
of  commercially  available  information-based  identity 
authentication solutions have been used for several years, this 
process has been found to be highly successful in reducing 
the amount of fraud caused by the misuse of identities.  It 
is assumed that similar successes can be achieved in other 
environments  where  identity  fraud  has  thrived,  such  as 
terrorism, drug trafficking and alien smuggling.
Another aspect of effectiveness is the availability of other 
means to accomplish the purpose intended by the product 
that uses personally identifiable information.  However, for 
such alternative means to be considered viable, they must 
be  at  least  as  effective,  commercially  usable  and  privacy 
sensitive as the solution under consideration.   Again, using 
the credit card issuance scenario as an example, for other 
solutions to be considered viable, they must initially reduce 
the fraud caused by the misuse of identity during the credit 
card  issuance.    This  factor  alone  eliminates  any  solution 
that  requires  use  of  a  biometric  or  token-based  identity 
authentication  solution,  since  both  potential  solutions 
require  a  preexisting  means  of  confirming  the  identity  of 
an individual through a reliable universal credential, and 
no such document currently exists.  Further, time constraints 
of the normal credit card issuance process precludes other 
potential solutions, such as traditional background checks 
involving  contacting  unbiased  job  or  credit  references.   
Therefore, at least in the credit card issuance process, not 
only  has  the  commercially  provided  information-based 
solution been found to have been effective, there exist  no 
other even potentially viable comparable solutions. 
The  second  significant  factor  in  the  evaluation  of  the 
privacy impact of a product that uses personally identifiable 
information  is  proportionality.    Essentially,  this  factor 
involves consideration of  the need for a particular type of 
personally identifiable information in achieving the desired 
purpose.  In evaluating this factor, consideration must be 
given to the societal benefit of the desired objective and 
the  sensitivity  of  the  type  of  information  involved.    For 
example,  for  identity  authentication  in  the  credit  granting 
environment, commercial entities typically use several types 
of  identifying  information  and  one  of  them  is  the  Social 
Security Number.   The Social Security Number is deemed 
sensitive because of its propensity for being abused in some 
identity theft cases.  However, it has been found during the 
credit card issuance process that its availability allows for 
a  significant  enhancement  in  the  identity  authentication 
process.  Consequently, although the Social Security Number 
is a sensitive type of personally identifiable information, the 39
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importance of the social security number for fraud prevention 
preponderates in favor of its use.
The third factor, which focuses of limiting the risk of harm 
to  the  individual,  generally  requires  consideration  of  the 
Fair Information Practices or FIP .  The components of FIP 
are usually considered to be notice, choice, access, security 
and  enforcement,  although  most  privacy  regimes  also 
include consideration of limited data use and retention and 
allowance for individual redress.  
These issues raise the challenge of striking the right balance 
between the competing interpretations of privacy and the 
means to protect it in a digital world.
Domestic and Global Policy
As  discussed  above,  the  principal  focus  of  U.S.  and 
international  legislation,  pertaining  to  identity  theft  and 
identity fraud, has been the criminalization of the misuse 
of  identities  and  the  imposition  of  tighter  privacy  and 
security requirements on the use of personally identifiable 
information.  Even when particular legislation has promoted 
identity authentication, it has been biometric and credential-
based, while, with limited exceptions such as Section 326 
of the USA PATRIOT ACT, failing to recognize the need for 
information-based identity authentication solutions.
As demonstrated by the recent Federal Trade Commission 
Report,  “Overview  of  the  Identity  Theft  Program,”  it  is 
unfortunately undeniable that that the identity theft problem, 
and by natural extension the identity fraud problem, continues 
virtually  unabated.    We  need,  to  paraphrase  Assistant 
Treasury Secretary Wayne Abernathy, to put into the hands 
of  those  institutions  that  need  it  more  information  about 
the identities of the people who seek to do business with 
an institution than an identity thief would have (Abernathy 
2003). This is most definitely the case when the person is 
new to the institution and there exist no available or reliable 
biometric  or  token-based  solutions  to  authenticate  the 
person.  This new or initial phase of contact is often referred 
to as “enrollment.”
However, the ability to authenticate the foreign traveler at 
enrollment through the use of an information-based system, 
given the present state of public record availability, is virtually 
impossible.  Enrollment authentication of the foreign traveler 
is dependent upon the availability of global information: 
Knowledge-based systems have been developed 
to aid in authenticating the identity of U.S. citizens.  
These systems access a wide number of identifiers 
in domestic public records through identification 
scores that verify information supplied by individuals 
seeking visas and other travel and identifying 
documents.  This system has proven effective for 
U.S. citizens, but it has not yet been replicated for 
non-U.S. citizens because information from global 
sources is not collected at this time.  The events 
of September 11th shed light on this deficiency, its 
relationship to homeland security, and the urgent 
need to acquire and integrate this data into useful 
systems to help authenticate and validate identity 
(Willox, 2003, p. 1).
Further  complicating  the  matter,  some  international  laws, 
such as the European Union Data Protection Directive, will 
not  permit  the  exporting  of  personal  information,  except 
under very limited circumstances.  
Although the breadth, and wisdom, of international privacy 
laws that completely prohibit data exportation for identity 
authentication  purposes  are  beyond  the  purview  of  this 
paper, there is a means to accomplish identity authentication, 
while respecting the privacy regime of a given locale.  It is to 
accomplish identity authentication at the origin of the data, 
while  transmitting  only  the  authentication  score  or  result.   
By allowing the authentication process to occur within the 
country where the data resides, a country is free to examine 
and audit the authentication processor for compliance with 
that country’s privacy laws, while not inhibiting necessary 
identity authentication.     
In addition, as was shown in Section IV, global laws and 
regulations on identity fraud differ from country to country.   
Only selected countries were reviewed, which points to the 
fact that there has been no comprehensive study of existing 
identity fraud global laws, regulations, and remedies.   Such 
a study would help lay the foundation for the sharing of 
information  through  treatises  (Mutual  Legal  Assistance 
Treatises and extradition) and cross border laws.
Challenges in this area include developing a comprehensive 
legal and regulatory strategy and gaining an understanding 
of the global issues and their impact worldwide.
Dedicated Resources
Until  the  events  of  9/11,  identity  fraud  had  not  been  a 
high priority in government or the private sector.  As the 
problem continues to grow and there has been heightened 
awareness of its insidious nature, finding solutions to it has 
been given a higher priority and more efforts have been 
made to mitigate it. Successfully combating this problem will 40
Identity Fraud: A Critical National and Global Threat
require a significant monetary outlay in order to fund 
the research to measure and understand the problem, 
establish a centralized identity fraud reporting system, 
create a trusted environment for information sharing, 
encourage the research and development necessary to 
produce a trusted identity fraud authentication system, 
purchase and implement this new technology, hire new 
personnel, and train the staff.
As  has  been  stated  in  many  parts  of  this  paper, 
managing identity fraud will take a holistic approach, 
one  that  cannot  be  successful  if  done  piecemeal.   
Acquiring  sufficient  funding  to  tackle  this  problem  in 
this manner is a major challenge.
Leadership
Several good efforts are underway to reduce the impact 
of identity fraud, but they need to be brought together. 
A  lack  of  strong  central  leadership  inhibits  this  from 
occurring.   Identity fraud has become a national and 
global problem.  Once a problem has risen to that level, 
the government must take a central role in providing the 
leadership to help solve it.  Inherent in that leadership 
is  the  need  for  a  central  forum  through  which  issues 
can be resolved.  As has been discussed throughout this 
paper, these issues are complex and dynamic.
The challenges are for the federal government to provide 
the  leadership  to  bring  the  current  efforts  together 
and to create a forum through which consensus, best 
practices,  and  cooperation  can  be  facilitated  and 
developed.
Recommendations
In  order  to  meet  these  challenges,  we  are  proposing 
that  a  comprehensive  national  and  global  strategy  to 
combat the identity fraud problem be implemented. The 
recommendations  offered  here  are  intended  to  lay  the 
framework for the development of such a plan.  High level 
federal  government  direction  and  funding  are  essential 
to  this  proposal.  The  federal  government  must  make  a 
commitment of both leadership and resources in order for 
the strategy to be realized.  The components of the plan 
will work together to provide the data, research analysis, 
trusted environment, laws and regulations, and research 
and development necessary to manage the identity fraud 
problem by rendering fraudulent documents ineffective and 
allowing accurate assessment of identity, while enhancing 
the protection of privacy.
Recommendation 1:  Gain a commitment from the 
highest levels of federal government to lead and 
fund a national strategy to combat the identity fraud 
problem.
Putting a national policy in place to combat identity fraud 
requires leadership from the highest levels of government, a 
White House directive, and a committee that brings together 
the key stakeholders to develop consensus and cooperation.     
White papers and other studies such as this should be used 
to  educate  individuals  in  Congress  and  various  federal 
departments, such as the Department of Homeland Security, 
about the importance of organizing, facilitating, and funding 
the development and implementation of a national strategy.   
These  individuals  will  need  to  convene  a  group  of  high-
level  government  officials,  private  sector  individuals,  and 
academics whose responsibility will be to study emerging 
information challenges and make recommendations directly 
to the White House and Congress.  Such a committee would 
drive  the  recommendations  in  this  white  paper  regarding 
data analysis and research, privacy and security, limitations 
Comprehensive National and                  
Global Strategy Recommendations
1.  Gain a commitment from the highest 
levels of federal government to lead and 
fund a national strategy to combat the 
identity fraud problem.
2.  Establish a central information database 
of identity fraud incidents.
3.  Establish a national identity fraud 
research agenda.
4.  Establish more sophisticated domestic and 
global information -sharing networks.
5.  Conduct a study of existing domestic and 
global policies, laws, and regulations to 
determine best practices for combating 
identity fraud.
6.  Enhance the protection of individual 
privacy and information ownership.
7.  Improve information sharing systems that 
enhance identity authentication solutions 
while protecting privacy.41
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on  data  and  data  sharing,  dedicated  resources,  and 
domestic and global policy.  One of the committee’s charges 
should be the development of standards and best practices 
that allow for the protection of privacy, while not inhibiting 
commerce or placing national security at risk.  In order to 
meet its charge and goals the group will require appropriate 
funding.  A model for this approach is the Transportation 
Security Administration’s Office of National Risk Assessment 
(ONRA),  which  is  developing  terrorism  risk  management 
strategies, policies, and technologies.  
Recommendation 2:  Establish a central information 
database of identity fraud incidents. 
A major barrier to determining the extent of the identity fraud 
threat is the absence of a centralized information collection 
and  sharing  mechanism  for  incidents  of  identity  fraud.   
The  Federal  Trade  Commission  Sentinel  Database,  which 
contains consumer complaints of identity theft, is a model 
for the development of an identity fraud database. However, 
there is minimal systematized sharing of identity fraud case 
data horizontally among independent enforcement agencies 
on  the  same  government  level.    Likewise,  there  is  little 
systematized data sharing vertically, among different levels 
of government (i.e., federal, state, local).  A comprehensive 
identity fraud classification system needs to be developed to 
systematically measure the size, scope, and impact of identity 
fraud. A database utilizing such a classification system would 
enable  the  effective  coordination  and  normalization  of 
identity fraud data on a national level, help perfect methods 
for  recording  identity  fraud  subset  data,  and  establish  a 
sound foundation for meaningful research that will enhance 
methods  of  identity  fraud  prevention  and  control.    The 
development of a national database on identity fraud case 
information  and  a  system  for  accessing  and  sharing  the 
data holds great potential for the administration of several 
empirical studies.
Recommendation 3:  Establish a national identity 
fraud research agenda.
1.  Exploratory and Descriptive Studies to Record and 
Understand the Size and Scope of Identity Fraud 
The  national  database,  described  above,  will  provide  a 
central, normalized recording and reporting of incidents of 
identity fraud. Using the database, researchers will be able 
to produce statistics that will not just reflect criminal incident 
volume, but will produce aggregate figures on case-specific 
characteristics  such  as  duration  of  offenses,  monetary 
loss,  association  with  other  offenses,  criminal  methods, 
criminal behavior, and extent of identity fraud conspiracies.   
Comprehensive trend studies can be produced with an eye 
toward  exploring  emerging  relationships  among  variables 
such as offender methods and financial damage resulting 
from the offenses.  Additional studies, such as one focused 
on  the  impact  of  identity  fraud  on  domestic  and  global 
commerce, will be possible.
2.  A Study of Criminal Organizations Using Identity 
Fraud as a Facilitator
The development of a national database of identity fraud 
case  information  would  allow  research  on  individuals 
and  criminal  groups  that  perpetuate  identity  fraud  as  an 
enabler  to  the  achievement  of  other  criminal  objectives 
(e.g., terrorism, alien smuggling, drug trafficking, weapons 
smuggling).  Network  analysis  could  be  used  to  track 
relationships  and  assess  the  strengths  of  relationships 
among offenders and identity fraud ring organizations both 
nationally and internationally.
3.  Effectiveness of Identity Fraud Investigation and 
Prosecution 
A  national  database  of  identity  fraud  case  information 
would be the source of a content analysis of identity fraud 
cases charged vs. those dismissed, isolating characteristics 
essential  for  successful  case  investigations.  Likewise, 
discriminate  analyses  of  identity  fraud  conviction  rates 
could be conducted focusing on the effects of factors such 
as  strength  of  evidence,  complexity  of  cases,  source  of 
discovery, and inter-jurisdictional enforcement coordination, 
on the ultimate outcomes of identity fraud prosecutions.  A 
similar global database would provide further information.
4.  Identification of Characteristics of Victims 
A comprehensive national database of identity fraud incidents 
would permit the examination of characteristics of individuals, 
agencies,  and  businesses  falling  victim  to  identity  fraud 
offenders.  In  effect,  aggregate  data  would  allow  research 
that  isolates  those  characteristics  and  combinations  of 
characteristics which create vulnerabilities precipitating identity 
fraud victimization. The results of such studies could be used 
to model risks and risk relationships that, if left unchecked, 
raise the probability of identity fraud victimization.  This type 
of  research  would  be  especially  useful,  because  it  would 
optimize  risk  assessment  of  combinations  of  vulnerabilities 
which are strongly associated with identity fraud victimizations.   
This, in turn, would increase the effectiveness of validation, 
verification, and authentication strategies and systems. 42
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Recommendation 4:  Establish more sophisticated 
domestic and global information sharing networks.
The  establishment  of  more  sophisticated  domestic  and 
global  networks  will  provide  the  requisite  information  for 
accurate  validation,  verification,  and  authentication.    The 
following recommendations will facilitate the development 
of these networks.
Data Sharing Policies and Standards
Comprehensive  policies,  standards,  laws,  and  regulations 
must be developed to define how personal information and 
records can be shared, who can have access to them, and 
under what circumstances they can be shared.  Exceptions for 
detecting criminal behavior and national security purposes 
must be fully articulated.
Accessible Databases
Specialized  domestic  and  global  commercial,  private, 
and  government  databases  must  be  made  available  or 
created.  These databases must provide personal identifier 
records that can be accessed by concerned entities, without 
jeopardizing privacy or the security of the data, and at the 
same time reducing liability and providing indemnification. 
This will require numerous agreements among governments, 
governments  and  the  private  sector,  and  private  sector 
organizations.  The United States government must take a 
strong central leadership role if this is to occur.  As stated in 
section V of this paper, global data collection is much more 
of a challenge than domestic data and is critical for national 
security.  Public private partnerships should be formed to 
help acquire or gain access to global data, especially data 
from riskiest parts of the world, to help protect borders and 
promote commerce.
Recommendation 5:  Conduct a study of existing 
domestic and global policies, laws, and regulations 
to determine best practices for combating identity 
fraud.
It is necessary to complete a comprehensive study of existing 
domestic  and  global  laws  and  regulations  concerning 
identity fraud, data collection, and information sharing. The 
study should ascertain areas of ambiguity and gaps, review 
potential remedies, suggest methods of sharing data, and 
propose model identity fraud laws.   These results should 
yield  a  best  practices  approach  for  managing  identity 
fraud and be the first step in developing agreements for 
promulgating comprehensive laws and sharing data on a 
global basis.
Recommendation 6:  Enhance the protection of 
individual privacy and information ownership.
Inherent in all of the recommendations proposed in this white 
paper is the goal of enhancing the protection of privacy.  As 
solutions are developed to combat identity fraud, it is crucial 
to  consider  the  enhancement  of  individual  privacy  and 
information ownership.  Policies which require the protection of 
privacy while balancing the need for information sharing must 
be established.  Inherent in such policies will be risk assessment, 
as well as the assessment of potential harms including, financial 
loss,  personal  safety,  civil  or  criminal  violations,  and  the 
unauthorized release of personal, government, or commercial 
data.  Various technology and information industry groups, as 
well as government organizations such as the Department of 
Commerce’s National Institute for Standards and Technology 
and the President’s E-Authentication E-Government initiative, 
have  proposed  principles  and  standards  and  policies  to 
address privacy and information sharing issues.  These efforts 
can provide the framework for a comprehensive government 
and industry policy, if leadership is provided to incorporate 
them into a national policy.
Recommendation 7:  Improve information sharing 
systems that enhance identity authentication 
solutions while protecting privacy.
Because  the  authentication  of  identifiers  presented  in 
the  procurement  of  a  breeder  document  is  the  critical 
stage  in  preventing  identity  fraud,  an  information-based 
authentication system is the only solution that truly works. 
While  identity  authentication  systems  currently  exist,  they 
are  not  robust  enough  nor  do  they  provide  the  requisite 
privacy and information security that must be included in a 
trusted system.  Therefore, the focus must be on the research 
and development of a trusted system (see Section V) that 
will  effectively  and  efficiently  authenticate  identity,  while 
maintaining the privacy and security of personal identifier 
information.    Such  a  system  will  go  a  long  way  toward 
rendering  fraudulent  breeder  documents  ineffective.  The 
design of the system must be such that it will enable decisions 
regarding identity to be made without hampering commerce 
or impacting on national security.  
In  order  for  the  advanced  identification  authentication 
decision-making system to be accepted by the leadership 
committee  members  (Recommendation  1),  there  must  be 
an oversight committee to monitor the use of such a system.   
The purpose of the committee will be to insure that the system 
is audited for accountability.  New knowledge gained from the 43
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analysis of the information collected in a centralized database 
(Recommendation 2) and from research studies proposed in 
Recommendation 3 will improve the system’s decision making 
process.  The system will only be effective if large amounts 
of  domestic  and  global  data  are  made  available  through 
sophisticated information-sharing networks (Recommendation 
4).  The forging of these networks will be facilitated by the 
knowledge gained in studying existing domestic and global 
policies,  laws,  and  regulations  (Recommendation  5).    This 
will  result  in  developing  global  best  practices  to  facilitate 
information  sharing.    Recommendation  6,  “Enhance  the 
protection of individual privacy and information ownership,” is 
a central tenet of an information based identity authentication 
system.  Absent this, the system will not be trusted and will 
not  be  accepted  by  governments,  private  sector  entities, 
individuals and the organizations representing their interests, 
and other impacted constituencies.
Conclusion
As John S. Pistole of the FBI noted in his remarks before the 
House Select Committee on Homeland Security on October 
1, 2003, 
The crucial element in the acceptance of any form 
of identification is the ability to verify the actual 
true identity of the bearer of the identification.  In 
today’s post-9/11 world, this element is all the 
more important because, in order to protect the 
American people, we must be able to determine 
whether an individual is who they purport to be.  
This is essential in our mission to identify potential 
terrorists, locate their means of financial support, 
and prevent acts of terrorism from occurring. 
Identity fraud is a national crisis with global implications.  Its 
pervasiveness must be recognized, especially as a facilitator 
of crimes that threaten national security, the economy, and 
personal privacy and security.  If identity fraud is not seen 
as a significant and insidious threat, it will not be dealt with 
accordingly. Ronald D. Malfi’s statement to the Committee on 
Homeland Security on October 1, 2003 indicates the enormity 
of the threat.  He outlined the tests conducted by the Office 
of Special Investigations which showed that fraudulent driver’s 
licenses and birth certificates were sufficient to gain entry to the 
United States from Jamaica, Barbados, Mexico, and Canada.   
During their investigation, they were able to purchase firearms 
in five states using counterfeit driver’s licenses with fictitious 
identifiers.  They were able to gain access to federal buildings, 
as well.  “In March, 2002, we breached the security of four 
federal office buildings in the Atlanta area using counterfeit 
law  enforcement  credentials  to  obtain  genuine  building 
passes, when we then counterfeited.  We were also able to 
obtain building passes that authorized us to carry firearms in 
the buildings” (Malfi, 2003). Malfi listed three conclusions: “(1) 
government officials and others generally did not recognize 
that the documents we presented were counterfeit; (2) many 
government officials were not alert to the possibility of identity 
fraud and some failed to follow security procedures and (3) 
identity verification procedures are inadequate” (Malfi 2003).     
Understanding and facing the threat of identity fraud is crucial 
to solving it. This white paper has focused on exposing the 
problems that Postole and Malfi discussed in their October 
1, 2003 remarks.  It continues further, however, and offers 
recommendations to help combat them.
The challenges to solving the problem are many.  The key is 
to authenticate personal identifiers used to procure breeder 
documents,  thus  rendering  fraudulent  identities  ineffective.   
Inherent in that challenge, however, is the need to classify, 
collect,  and  share  identity  fraud  data,  both  domestically 
and  globally,  while  enhancing  the  protection  of  privacy  of 
individuals and meeting the needs of domestic and global 
commerce, law enforcement, and national security.  
Meeting  those  challenges  will  necessitate  strong  national 
leadership in the United States, new methods of collecting and 
classifying identity fraud, a comprehensive research agenda, 
and  an  investment  in  the  research  and  development  of 
emerging and promising technologies.  The same effort must 
be undertaken on a global scale to facilitate the formulation 
of best practices for combating identity fraud and enhancing 
information sharing.
 
Without  a  national  and  global  strategy,  identity  fraud  will 
continue to grow exponentially, as will the possibility of terrorist 
acts, financial crimes, drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, 
and alien smuggling, all of which have an adverse impact on 
the global community and commerce.  The recommendations 
offered here are an attempt to manage identity fraud so that its 
growth will be contained and reduced. Inherent in the success 
of a strategy to do so is the commitment of the highest levels 
of government, both in terms of leadership and resources, 
which  will  facilitate  the  implementation  of  a  research 
agenda and the development of an information database of 
identity fraud incidents.  These, in concert with sophisticated 
information-sharing  networks  will  lead  to  the  development 
of a best practices policy and improved information sharing 
systems,  which,  in  turn  will  enhance  and  enable  identity 
authentication.
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